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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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TABLE 14.—Farm food products: Farm-retail spread and farmer's share of the retail cost, October–December 1966, July–September 1966, October–December 1965, and 1957–59 average—Continued

Product <sup>1</sup>	Retail unit	Farm-retail spread					Farmer's share				
		October–December 1966	July–September 1966 <sup>2</sup>	October–December 1965 <sup>2</sup>	1957–59 average	Percent change, October–December 1966 from—		October–December 1966	July–September 1966	October–December 1965	1957–59 average
						July–September 1966	October–December 1965				
Beef, Choice grade.....	Pound.....	Cents 36.7	Cents 35.3	Cents 36.0	Cents 29.8	4	2	56	58	57	62
Lamb, Choice grade.....	do.....	40.7	41.8	34.7	20.8	-3	17	53	52	57	57
Pork.....	do.....	34.8	30.6	27.0	29.5	14	29	50	58	62	51
Butter.....	do.....	25.1	19.7	20.3	20.6	27	24	71	77	73	72
Cheese, American process.....	½ pound.....	25.3	23.2	21.8	18.1	9	16	44	46	42	44
Ice cream.....	½ gallon.....	57.2	55.2	53.2	60.8	4	4	31	33	29	28
Milk, evaporated.....	14½-ounce can.....	8.9	8.2	8.5	8.3	9	5	47	49	44	43
Milk, fresh:											
Home delivered.....	½ gallon.....	31.8	31.9	30.5	28.9	( <sup>3</sup> )	4	45	43	43	43
Sold in stores.....	do.....	26.2	26.2	26.0	24.7	0	5	50	48	47	47
Chickens, frying ready-to-cook.....	Pound.....	20.9	20.9	18.7	19.1	0	12	46	50	51	56
Eggs, Grade A large.....	Dozen.....	21.0	20.1	20.6	20.1	4	2	67	66	66	64
Bread, white:											
All ingredients.....	Pound.....	10.2	18.5	17.5	15.5	4	10	16	18	16	16
Wheat.....	do.....	20.2	23.5	24.1		3	9	13	14	13	13
Bread, whole or cracked wheat.....	do.....	27.7	27.3	26.4		3	9	12	13	11	
Cookies, sandwich.....	do.....	27.7	27.3	26.4		3	9	10	10	8	
Corn flakes.....	12 ounces.....	38.2	34.3	36.4	22.1	11	5	38	42	37	35
Flour, white.....	5 pounds.....	11.5	17.1	9.7	11.4	-33	17	33	27	37	29
Apples.....	Pound.....	12.8	12.3	10.9	8.0	4	17	15	30	19	25
Grapefruit.....	Each.....	18.2	17.0	17.0	14.2	7	7	27	29	26	23
Lemons.....	Pound.....	67.4	62.0	62.4	42.8	9	8	23	26	23	35
Oranges.....	Dozen.....	7.8	7.7	6.4	6.3	1	22	36	36	27	28
Cabbage.....	Pound.....	10.3	11.6	10.3	10.8	-11	0	32	33	31	26
Carrots.....	do.....	10.7	11.5	10.6	10.9	-7	1	30	38	32	29
Celery.....	do.....	12.6	13.0	13.0		-3	-3	37	35	32	
Cucumbers.....	do.....	18.5	17.8	17.9	16.6	4	3	31	37	33	27
Lettuce.....	Head.....	8.3	9.4	8.1	6.7	-12	2	37	37	22	34
Onions.....	Pound.....	21.7	21.3	17.9		2	21	34	36	41	
Peppers, green.....	10 pounds.....	51.9	55.7	47.2	40.5	-7	10	29	28	30	31
Potatoes.....	10 ounces.....	23.1	22.2	23.1		4	0	21	27	21	
Spinach.....	Pound.....	21.1	20.6	22.4	19.5	2	-6	38	36	37	35
Tomatoes.....	No. 2½ can.....	26.9	29.3	26.1	28.2	-8	3	17	16	17	18
Peaches, canned.....	do.....	38.0	38.1	38.3		( <sup>4</sup> )	-1	16	20	24	
Pears, canned.....	No. 303 can.....	16.2	16.3	15.6		1	4	7	7	7	
Beets, canned.....	do.....	19.8	19.7	17.6	15.4	1	12	12	12	13	13
Corn, canned.....	do.....	21.0	20.5	20.6	17.9	2	2	15	15	14	15
Peas, canned.....	do.....	14.9	14.5	13.1	13.3	3	14	18	19	21	15
Tomatoes, canned.....	do.....	14.6	14.5	11.9	15.2	1	23	37	37	45	35
Orange juice, concentrate, frozen.....	6-ounce can.....	13.3	13.3	12.5		0	0	15	16	23	
French fried potatoes, frozen.....	9 ounces.....	17.0	16.5	16.4	16.7	3	4	17	18	18	16
Peas, frozen.....	10 ounces.....	13.1	13.1	10.0	9.4	0	31	32	34	46	42
Beans, navy.....	Pound.....	21.1	18.9	20.1	19.6	12	5	28	34	28	28
Margarine.....	do.....	30.0	30.1	29.7	27.3	( <sup>4</sup> )	9	14	23	27	24
Peanut butter.....	12-ounce jar.....	31.0	28.5	27.1		9	14	23	27	24	
Salad and cooking oil.....	Pint.....	62.6	55.0	50.8	62.2	14	5	32	39	31	31
Vegetable shortening.....	5 pounds.....	39.1	38.7	37.7	34.3	1	4	36	36	36	37
Sugar.....	do.....	14.0	13.6	13.2		3	6	13	14	13	
Spaghetti with sauce, canned.....	16½-ounce can.....										

<sup>1</sup> Product groups include more items than those listed in this table. For example, in addition to the products listed—Choice beef, lamb, and pork (major products except lamb)—the meat products group includes lower grades of beef, the minor edible pork products, and veal.

<sup>2</sup> Most farm-retail spread figures for July–September 1966 and October–December 1965 have been revised; figures in other columns revised as indicated.

<sup>3</sup> For the bakery products group and the individual wheat products, the farmers share is based on the market price of wheat received by farmers plus the cost of the marketing certificate to processors. This cost equals the value of the domestic marketing certificate received by farmers complying fully with the wheat program.

<sup>4</sup> Less than 0.5 percent.

## INDIANA LAW STUDENTS AID CONSUMER LEGISLATION

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, a wonderful experiment in education is taking place which is exciting, imaginative, and significant. The participants are the Indiana University Law School and the President's Committee on Consumer Interests. The beneficiaries may well be all Americans.

Prof. F. Reed Dickerson has arranged with the President's Committee on Consumer Interests to have his seminar in legislation at the law school develop a position paper for the President's Committee on Consumer Interests to submit to any National Commission on Product Safety that may be established by the Congress.

This project cannot help but be of benefit to all concerned. For the students, it will be an opportunity to do legal research on a live and current problem. For the Commission that may

be established, it will be a sorely needed piece of research in a field that has been relatively neglected. For the President's Committee on Consumer Interests, it will be at the very least a background paper for use in developing their own recommendations.

The 15 students involved and Professor Dickerson are to be congratulated for this public service they are rendering. If this project is successful, it will encourage students and professors in a wide variety of professional schools to work with Government agencies on current problems.

I ask unanimous consent that the names of the students, a letter from Mrs. Esther Peterson, the President's former Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs, and a statement of mission describing the project be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FEBRUARY 21, 1967.

Prof. F. REED DICKERSON,  
School of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.

DEAR PROFESSOR DICKERSON: I can't begin to tell you how pleased I am that you are willing to allow your seminar in legislation at the Indiana University Law School to assist the President's Committee on Consumer Interests in a very important and timely project.

As you know, President Johnson has called on the Congress to enact legislation establishing a National Commission on Product Safety. We have every expectation that such a Commission will be established, and that we will be called upon to make recommendations. The work of your seminar could be invaluable to us in preparing our recommendations. In any event, I would plan to turn over to the Safety Commission the document being prepared by your students.

I am thoroughly convinced that the relationship between our Committee and the Indiana School of Law cannot but be of mutual benefit, and I eagerly await your final

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product. My thanks to you and your students for participating in this worthwhile innovation.

Sincerely,

Mrs. ESTHER PETERSON,  
Special Assistant to the President for  
Consumer Affairs.

## B777 SEMINAR IN LEGISLATION

Mr. Dickerson.  
Altman, Jerry Dean, 809 E. Hunter Ave.,  
Apt. 2, Bloomington, Indiana.  
Andrews, Kenneth Lee, 708 E. University  
Ave., Bloomington, Indiana.  
Baken, Alan, 3315 Longview Ave., Apt. 35,  
Bloomington, Indiana.  
Bloom, Lewis Elliott, Campus View Hse.,  
Apt. 828, Bloomington, Indiana.  
Russell, Donald Dee, 423 E. 4th St., Bloom-  
ington, Indiana.  
Eskridge, James Hubbard, 323 S. Grant St.,  
Apt. 1, Bloomington, Indiana.  
Fehr, Michael, Walnut Grove Trailer Ct.,  
No. 150, Bloomington, Indiana.  
Gowdy, Robert, Hepburn Apt., Rm. C-113,  
Bloomington, Indiana.  
Hawk, Robert, 2110 N. Walnut St., Bloom-  
ington, Indiana.  
Kixmiller, Robert, Hepburn Apt., Rm.  
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Lewis, Donald, 305 E. Vermilya, Tennells  
Trailer Ct., Lot 11, Bloomington, Indiana.  
Meredith, Roger Lynn, 1103½ S. Lincoln  
St., Bloomington, Indiana.  
Murphy, Edward, 414 S. Henderson St.,  
Apt. 7, Bloomington, Indiana.  
Stanley, Kelly, 508 S. Fess Ave., Apt. 9,  
Bloomington, Indiana.  
Wilks, John, 510 E. Smith Ave., Apt. 1,  
Bloomington, Indiana.

## STATEMENT OF MISSION

The mission of the Seminar in Legislation is to develop a position paper for the President's Committee on Consumer Interests to submit to any National Commission on Product Safety, which may be established by Senate Joint Resolution 33.

The focus of the paper will be "household products" other than those excepted by section 6 of the Resolution. These are defined very broadly as "products customarily produced or distributed for sale through retail sales agencies or instrumentalities for use by a consumer or any member of his family." This includes all consumer products except those regulated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, or the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. However, products regulated under the Flammable Fabrics Act are included, even though that Act is listed in the current text of section 6.

The first objective is to discover and define the areas within which household products carry unreasonable hazards of physical harm, and to develop criteria for determining whether such a product or group of products is sufficiently hazardous to warrant legislative intervention. This involves considering not only the seriousness of the threatened injury and its incidence, but also the degree of consumer vulnerability. Hazards that affect only property or convenience need not be considered.

The second objective is to develop criteria for selecting the most feasible approaches and sanctions in those instances in which legislative intervention appears to be called for. Feasibility includes such factors as cost and inconvenience to the industry concerned, the need to make the product available, and the source of the hazard, that is, whether it results from faulty design or faulty construction.

The third objective is to study in detail the more important household products or groups of household products. Presumably, these will be products involving serious physical hazards of high incidence and with re-

spect to which the consumer is highly vulnerable. Each study should cover the kinds of hazards involved, their seriousness, and their incidence; application of the criteria for legislative intervention; and application of the criteria for selecting the most appropriate approaches and sanctions in preference to their reasonable alternatives. Where specific legislative action seems called for, the paper should include drafts of recommended legislation.

The position paper should include a background statement. Its conclusions and recommendations should be supported by adequate facts and rational explanation. This will require inventorying and evaluating existing consumer protections.

MARCH 1, 1967.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING  
BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE  
SOVIET UNION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the pending business, which the clerk will state.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A consular convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with a protocol relating thereto, signed at Moscow on June 1, 1964 (Ex. D, 88th Cong., 2d sess.).

The Senate proceeded to consider the convention.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, as a Member of this body and one who, as a vice consul for six years, has probably had the most personal experience as to why the Consular Convention should be ratified, I strongly urge that the Senate take favorable action.

I can well remember being stationed behind the Iron Curtain in Bratislava and establishing the consulate general there. I recall the frustration I felt when an American citizen was arrested, held in jail, and brutally maltreated while I was denied admittance to see him. And here I must add the importance to a prisoner of some friendly outside contact in order to provide at least some source of inner strength to a man who has been beaten and maltreated to make him implicate himself and others to the effect—in this case utterly false—that he was engaging in espionage for his own Government.

I also well remember, too, when we provided sanctuary for a Jewish employee during a minor pogrom. Since a consulate does not enjoy any kind of immunity, we sought to secure this immunity and give sanctuary by putting up the sign "Consular Archives" on our door. We adopted the same device another time when an employee of our consulate general, who had been cruelly beaten in an effort to implicate me and others, was released to us a sour, spiritless, listless physical wreck. When, after a few days, it looked as if he was going to be picked up and abused again, we invited him to stay within our building. And again we had to use the device of putting up the "Consular Archives" sign on our door. This would not have been necessary if

we had had a convention of this sort, since article 19 states that—

Consular officers shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving state in matters relating to their official activity.

The same applies to employees of the consular establishment, if they are nationals of the sending state.

When it comes to great numbers of traveling Americans, too, who want help and protection, we obviously should not fall them.

There is the argument against ratification that this convention might increase espionage on the part of the Soviet Union in the United States. I do not believe this argument valid. In the first place, the United States is an open society and the Soviet Union is a closed one. Accordingly, a Soviet Union tourist in the United States can photograph, see, and report on a great number of things; for similar activity in the Soviet Union an American citizen would be arrested. I have myself undergone this experience, having been arrested three times by Communist officials behind the curtain for actions that would not have raised an eyebrow in our own country. Actually, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander and the argument that this convention increases the opportunity for Soviet espionage in the United States can also be taken the other way in that it increases such opportunities for the United States in the Soviet Union. And, as I have said, it is much harder to secure information in a closed society like the Soviet Union than it is in an open one like ours. I am sure we would all agree that our consulates provide information to our Government just as do those of the Soviet Union to their Government.

In this regard I would imagine that the emotions of Gen. Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's opposite number in the Soviet Union, must be similar to those of Mr. Hoover in connection with the ratification of this convention.

From the viewpoint of espionage then it is a "wash" transaction, but with the edge to the United States, and from the general national interest viewpoint—the protection of our citizens, and from a viewpoint of eroding the Communist monolithic structure, the ratification of this convention can serve our country very well.

THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ON FOREIGN AND  
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a transcript of President Johnson's news conference on foreign and domestic matters, excerpts from President Johnson's state of the Union message relative to this matter, and a portion of his speech to editorial writers in New York City relevant to this matter.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Feb. 3, 1967]  
TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CON-  
FERENCE ON FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC MATTERS  
OPENING STATEMENT

Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen.  
I have been asked to give a statement about the consular convention that's pend-

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ing before the United States Senate and I should like to say very briefly that I hope the Senate will give its advice and consent to the proposed convention with the U.S.S.R.

I feel very strongly that the ratification of this treaty is very much in our national interest. I feel this way for two principle reasons:

First we need this treaty to protect the 18,000 American citizens who each year travel from this country to the Soviet Union.

The convention requires immediate notification to us whenever an American citizen is arrested in the Soviet Union and it insures our right to visit that citizen within four days and as soon thereafter as is desirable.

We think that we need these rights to help protect American citizens. These are rights which the Soviet citizens already have who travel in this country because they are guaranteed by our Constitution.

Second, the convention does not require the opening of consulates in this country or in the Soviet Union. It does provide that should any such consulates be opened, the officials would have diplomatic immunity.

The Secretary of State informs me that no negotiations for consulates are under way, and that the most that he can envision in the foreseeable future is the opening of one consulate in each country to be manned by from 10 to 15 people.

There are presently 452 Soviet officials in the United States that have diplomatic immunity. So if an additional consulate were opened, and if another 10 were added to the 452, Mr. Hoover has assured me that this small increment would raise no problems which the F. B. I. cannot effectively and efficiently deal with.

In short, I think we very much need this convention to protect American interests, to protect American citizens abroad. And in my judgment, it raises no problems with respect to our national security.

Therefore, I hope very much that the Senate in its wisdom, after full debate, will see fit to ratify it.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 11, 1967]  
STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE EXCERPTS,  
JANUARY 10, 1967

Our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are also in transition. We have avoided both the acts and the rhetoric of the cold war. When we have differed with the Soviet Union, we have tried to differ quietly and with courtesy. Our objective is not to continue the cold war, but to end it. We have:

Signed an agreement at the United Nations on the peaceful uses of outer space;

Agreed to open direct air flights with the Soviet Union;

Removed more than four-hundred non-strategic items from export control;

Determined that the Export-Import Bank can allow commercial credits to Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, as well as Rumania and Yugoslavia;

Entered into a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union for another two years;

Agreed with Bulgaria and Hungary to upgrade our legations to embassies; and

Started discussions with international agencies on ways of increasing contacts with Eastern European countries.

This Administration has taken these steps even as duty compelled us to fulfill and execute our treaty obligations throughout the world.

I ask and urge the Congress to help our foreign and commercial trade policies by passing an East-West Trade Bill and approving our consular convention with the Soviet Union.

EXCERPT FROM SPEECH OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF EDITORIAL WRITERS IN NEW YORK CITY ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1966

## HEALING THE WOUND

III. One great goal of a united West is to heal the wound in Europe which now cuts East from West and brother from brother.

That division must be healed peacefully. It must be healed with the consent of Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. This will happen only as East and West succeed in building a surer foundation of mutual trust.

Nothing is more important for peace. We must improve the East-West environment in order to achieve the unification of Germany in the context of a larger, peaceful and prosperous Europe.

Our task is to achieve a reconciliation with the East—a shift from the narrow concept of coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement.

Americans are prepared to do their part. Under the last four Presidents our policy toward the Soviet Union has been the same. Where necessary, we shall defend freedom; where possible we shall work with the East to build a lasting peace.

## MUST INTENSIFY EFFORTS

We do not intend to let our differences on Viet Nam or elsewhere prevent us from exploring all opportunities. We want the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe to know that we had our allies shall go step by step with them as far as they are willing to advance.

Let us—both Americans and Europeans—intensify our efforts.

We seek healthy economic and cultural relations with the Communist states.

I am asking for early congressional action on the U.S.-Soviet Union Consular Agreement.

We intend to press for legislative authority to negotiate trade agreements which could extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to European Communist states.

## NEW STEPS

And I am today announcing these new steps:

—We will reduce export controls on East-West trade with respect to hundreds of non-strategic items;

—I have today signed a determination that will allow the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credits to four additional Eastern European countries—Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. This is good business. And it will help us build bridges to Eastern Europe.

—The secretary of state is reviewing the possibility of easing the burden of Polish debts to the United States through expenditures of our Polish currency holdings which would be mutually beneficial to both countries.

—The Export-Import Bank is prepared to finance American exports for the Soviet-Italian Fiat auto plant.

—We are negotiating a civil air agreement with the Soviet Union. This will facilitate tourism in both directions.

—This summer the American government took additional steps to liberalize travel to Communist countries in Europe and Asia. We intend to liberalize these rules still further.

—In these past weeks the Soviet Union and the United States have begun to exchange cloud photographs taken from weather satellites.

## REMOVING BORDER DISPUTES

In these and many other ways, ties with the East will be strengthened—by the United States and by other Atlantic nations,

Agreement on a broad policy to this end should be sought in existing Atlantic organs.

The principles which should govern East-West relations are now being discussed in the North Atlantic Council.

The OECD can also play an important part in trade and contacts with the East. The Western nations can there explore ways of inviting the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries to cooperate in tasks of common interest and common benefit.

Hand-in-hand with these steps to increase East-West ties must go measures to remove territorial and border disputes as a source of friction in Europe. The Atlantic nations oppose the use of force to change existing frontiers.

The maintenance of old enmities is not in anyone's interest. Our aim is a true European reconciliation. We must make this clear to the East.

Further, it is our policy to avoid the spread of national nuclear programs—in Europe and elsewhere.

## SOVIET TROOP CUTBACKS

That is why we shall persevere in efforts to reach an agreement banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We seek a stable military situation in Europe—one in which tensions can be lowered.

To this end, the United States will continue to play its part in effective Western deterrence. To weaken that deterrence might create temptations and endanger peace.

The Atlantic allies will continue together to study what strength NATO needs, in light of changing technology and the current threat.

Reduction of Soviet forces in Central Europe would, of course, affect the extent of the threat.

If changing circumstances should lead to a gradual and balanced revision in force levels on both sides, the revision could—together with the other steps that I have mentioned—help gradually to shape a new political environment.

## A LONG PROCESS

The building of true peace and reconciliation in Europe will be a long process.

The bonds between the United States and its Atlantic partners provide the strength on which the world's security depends. Our interdependence is complete.

Our goal, in Europe and elsewhere, is a just and secure peace. It can most surely be achieved by common action. To this end, I pledge America's best efforts:

—to achieve new thrust for the Alliance;

—to support movement toward Western European unity;

—and to bring about a far-reaching improvement in relations between East and West.

Our object is to end the bitter legacy of World War II.

Success will bring the day closer when we have fully secured the peace in Europe, and in the world.

## RECESS UNTIL 2:30 O'CLOCK P.M.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess until 2:30 o'clock p.m. today.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 1 o'clock and 28 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess until 2:30 o'clock p.m., the same day.

At 2 o'clock and 30 minutes p.m., the Senate reassembled, and was called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. BAKER in the chair).

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Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

The Senate resumed the consideration of the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with a protocol relating thereto, signed at Moscow on June 1, 1964 (Ex. D, 88th Cong., 2d sess.).

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, the Senate is engaged in a discussion over whether to give its "advice and consent" that the President enter into a consular convention or treaty with the Soviet Union. That is the technical subject before us.

In reality, however, we are debating and considering a larger series of related proposals going far beyond a document which seeks to establish ground rules for such consulates as may be established in the respective countries by authority which resides in sources other than this treaty.

This series of proposals includes many aspects of our foreign and commercial trade policies with the Soviet Union. Among them are an East-West trade bill; a civil air agreement for direct air flights between the Soviet Union and the United States; virtual abolition of export controls on East-West trade on several hundreds of so-called nonstrategic items; extending and guaranteeing credits to several East European Communist countries; financing American exports for the Soviet-Italian Fiat auto plant to be constructed in Russia.

Further treaties are also contemplated between the Soviet Union and the United States, such as peaceful uses of space activities and space mechanisms, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and disarmament.

This wider scope of major, radical changes in our foreign policy and international relations has been spelled out in detail by the President a number of times.

First, perhaps, in this package form, where it received its widest publicity, was the New York meeting of the International Conference of Editorial Writers in October 1966.

Then there was reference to it in the state of the Union message of the President.

The third source was a number of occasions in news conferences in less formal ways when the President referred to the process of building bridges between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Another source for detailing and outlining the package, as it is sometimes called, has been the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

No one has asserted to the contrary, on the floor of this Chamber or elsewhere, that we are engaged in a series of related subjects which deal with fundamental relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is the position of this Senator that the Congress, and especially the Senate, should not act on this program in a fragmentary way. A piecemeal treatment does not befit a subject of this importance.

This debate, in its overall aspects, is not between proponents and opponents of the consular treaty. It is, and should be, rather, a debate between those who favor building bridges between East and West and between the United States and the Soviet Union and those who oppose building bridges at this time.

Advocates of the Consular Treaty are heard to say and to repeat frequently that the reason for their desire to ratify it is that they want to end the cold war, and no progress can be made toward this goal if we persist in a hostile, suspicious, adverse posture toward the Soviet Union.

Hence, it is argued by the proponents that if this treaty will result in even a small gain in advancing the cause of peace, it should be ratified.

Mr. President, there is no one who more fervently or more earnestly wishes an end of the cold war than this speaker. But to base action on hopes and prayers for peace or for termination of the cold war without further inquiry is a case of hopeless and harmful wishful thinking.

It takes action by two great nations to bring about an end to the cold war. No one knows this better than the President, because of his inability to get the enemy in our Vietnam war even to agree to sit down and talk about peace. Goodness knows he has tried for a long time, and persistently, to bring about that result.

Approval by the Senate of the Consular Treaty would endow the Soviet Union with a new prestige and added respectability in the eyes of the world. It would cause dismay in the hearts and minds of many nations and of many millions of people, including millions of Americans.

Before taking this step, it would be most advisable to determine the likelihood of the Soviet Union's making some small effort which could be considered effective to bring the cold war to an end, or even slow it down a little, or ameliorate it to some degree.

The record, however, plainly shows that the Soviet Union has rejected any promise to seek such a goal.

Mr. President, the President of the United States addressed the National Conference of Editorial Writers in New York City on October 7 of last year. There were three principal sections to his speech. The third part bore upon the subject of strengthening ties with the East, "to quicken progress in East-West relations."

It was there that President Johnson first set out, in comprehensive fashion, his program of bridge-building from the United States to Eastern Europe.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the Record

at this point an excerpt from the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents for October 10, 1966, as found on page 1426 hereof.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Let us—both Americans and Europeans—intensify our efforts.

We seek healthy economic and cultural relations with the Communist states.

I am asking for early Congressional action on the U.S.-Soviet consular agreement.

We intend to press for legislative authority to negotiate trade agreements which could extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to European Communist states.

And I am today announcing these new steps:

We will reduce export controls on East-West trade with respect to hundreds of non-strategic items;

I have today signed a determination that will allow the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credits to four additional Eastern European countries—Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. This is good business. And it will help us build bridges to Eastern Europe.

The Secretary of State is reviewing the possibility of easing the burden of Polish debts to the U.S. through expenditures of our Polish currency holdings which would be mutually beneficial to both countries.

The Export-Import Bank is prepared to finance American exports for the Soviet-Italian Fiat auto plant.

We are negotiating a civil air agreement with the Soviet Union. This will facilitate tourism in both directions.

This summer the American Government took additional steps to liberalize travel to Communist countries in Europe and Asia. We intend to liberalize these rules still further.

In these past weeks the Soviet Union and the United States have begun to exchange cloud photographs taken from weather satellites.

In these and many other ways, ties with the East will be strengthened—by the U.S. and by other Atlantic nations.

Mr. HRUSKA. The passage referred to, Mr. President, includes those related subjects which I believe to be a part of the entire package of proposals which deal with a major and radical change in our foreign policy, particularly toward the Soviet Union. This speech was the President's bid to help end the cold war.

The gesture is a good one. How was it received by the one other nation whose cooperation and acceptance of such a bid, or even consideration of such a bid, is necessary?

There was quick response; not from the Soviet Union government channels, Mr. President, but from a higher authority, the Communist Party which is the real ruler of the Soviet Union. The formal government channels are only a part of the organization through which the party rules the nation.

The New York Times of October 16, 1966, reported the remarks of Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist Party leader, as made in a Moscow speech at a Soviet-Polish friendship meeting. I shall quote pertinent parts of that news story. The article begins:

Moscow, Oct. 15.—Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, rebuffed today as "a strange and persistent delusion" the hope expressed by President Johnson

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that closer Soviet-United States cooperation was possible despite tensions over the war in Vietnam.

The United States must stop bombing North Vietnam and end its "aggression" before relations can be improved, the Soviet leader declared.

So, in response to President Johnson's list of proposals to improve relations with the Soviet Union in connection with the cold war, which has existed now for some 20 years, there was an outright rejection of any possibility of progress in that direction without accepting what the Soviet Union lays down as a prior necessity—the stopping of bombing of North Vietnam and the ending of aggression by the U.S. forces in that land.

Another portion of the news story reads as follows:

In his rejection of Mr. Johnson's appeal for steps to improve relations, Mr. Brezhnev said:

"We have declared many times that if the United States wants to develop mutually beneficial relations with the Soviet Union—in principle, we also would like this—then it is necessary to clear major obstacles from the path. The piratical bombing attacks against a socialist country, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, must be halted and the aggression against the Vietnamese people stopped."

Mr. Brezhnev added as a further condition:

"The sovereignty and territorial inviolability of other countries must be respected, not just in words but in deeds."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the text of the article to which I have referred, entitled "Soviet Calls United States 'Deluded' in Hope for New Ties Now," written by Raymond H. Anderson and published in the New York Times of October 16, 1966.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Oct. 16, 1966]

**SOVIET CALLS U.S. DELUDED IN HOPE FOR NEW TIES NOW—BREZHNEV REBUFS JOHNSON'S BID FOR COOPERATION WHILE VIETNAM WAR GOES ON—BLOC PARLEY EXPECTED—EAST EUROPE'S LEADERS SAID TO PLAN A CO-ORDINATION OF HARDER LINE ON CHINA**

(By Raymond H. Anderson)

Moscow, Oct. 15.—Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, rebuffed today as "a strange and persistent delusion" the hope expressed by President Johnson that closer Soviet-United States cooperation was possible despite tensions over the war in Vietnam.

The United States must stop bombing North Vietnam and end its "aggression" before relations can be improved, the Soviet leader declared.

Mr. Brezhnev's rejection was the first public statement by the Kremlin leadership in response to Mr. Johnson's appeal, made in a speech in New York eight days ago. Pravda, the Communist party newspaper, indicated last Sunday that the ending of the bombing raids was Moscow's major preliminary condition for any favorable responses to the President's overture.

The rebuff to President Johnson, made in a speech at a Soviet-Polish friendship meeting, came amid indication of an impending gathering of Soviet-bloc leaders here. According to East European sources, the meeting would discuss steps to coordinate harder policy against China, which is being denounced for obstructing Soviet-bloc assistance to North Vietnam.

## OTHERS DUE IN FEW DAYS

The two visiting Polish leaders, Vladyslaw Gomulka, the party chief, and Premier Josef Cyrankiewicz, are delaying their return to Warsaw. Tass, the Soviet press agency, reported that Janos Kadar, the Hungarian party chief, was enroute to Moscow with Premier Gyula Kallai and other Hungarian officials.

The leaders of East Germany, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria are said to be planning to come to Moscow within a few days.

Besides discussing the problems confronting the Soviet bloc as a result of China's attitudes, the leaders are expected to deal with President Johnson's overtures for an East-West reconciliation.

In his rejection of Mr. Johnson's appeal for steps to improve relations, Mr. Brezhnev said:

"We have declared many times that if the United States wants to develop mutually beneficial relations with the Soviet Union—in principle, we also would like this—then it is necessary to clear major obstacles from the path. The piratical bombing attacks against a socialist country, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, must be halted and the aggression against the Vietnamese people stopped."

Mr. Brezhnev added as a further condition: "The sovereignty and territorial inviolability of other countries must be respected, not just in words, but in deeds."

Mr. Gomulka also spoke at the meeting, which was held in the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses.

He assailed the United States intervention in the Vietnamese war and echoed Mr. Brezhnev's declaration that improved United States relations with Eastern Europe were impossible while the war continued.

"An unconditional end of the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by American aircraft must be the primary preliminary condition for embarking on the path of seeking a political solution of the Vietnam problem," the Polish leader continued.

Commenting Thursday on the demand for an end of the bombing raids, President Johnson said: "If the aggressor will pause, we will pause."

## CHINESE POLICY ASSAILED

Both Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gomulka criticized China's refusal to join in united Communist action to support North Vietnam.

Peking's obstructionism on Vietnam, the Soviet leader declared, evokes "bitter regrets and stern condemnation" from Communist nations, especially because China, "is the only socialist nation having a common border with Vietnam."

China, competing with the Soviet Union for leadership of the Communist movement, is said to hamper rail deliveries of Soviet-bloc aid to North Vietnam. The Chinese have termed Moscow's assistance as insignificant and asserted that it was mainly intended to mask a Moscow-Washington "plot" to settle the Vietnamese war through negotiations.

The denunciation of Peking's policies today followed a warning Thursday by Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin that "a decisive rebuff" must be given to the Chinese leadership by the world's Communists.

The coming meeting of Soviet-bloc leaders is expected to discuss the form that such a rebuff should take.

In his attack on the Chinese leadership, Mr. Brezhnev declared that Communists would be hypocrites if they failed to denounce Peking's "splitting" policies, its obstructive tactics on the Vietnamese war and the so-called "cultural revolution," which is seeking to oust all foreign influence in China and glorify Mao Tse-tung, the party leader.

"These policies, these actions can only discredit socialism in the eyes of the people and

confuse them," Mr. Brezhnev said. "The policies clearly are helpful to the imperialists. It is not without reason that their propaganda seizes upon the events taking place in China."

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I submit that in view of this emphatic and almost instantaneous response to the "building bridges" speech of the President in October of 1966, the outlook is not very bright for the ratification of this treaty in any way to lessen tensions between these two nations. In fact, it is nonexistent. The idea is rejected.

I wonder sometimes if those who say "We want to end the cold war, and therefore we will do anything the enemy asks, virtually, to gain that end," would include the cessation of bombing in North Vietnam and the ending of aggression, as it is viewed by the Russians and by the Vietnamese forces in Vietnam. I wonder if there is a parallel there to the ideas and wishes of those who say, "We want to end the hostilities in Vietnam," and who would be willing to do so at the price of complying with and abiding by the conditions which either the Soviet Union or the North Vietnamese would dictate.

More recent affirmations in this general area are to be found in declarations of the Soviet leaders in connection with celebrating the 50th anniversary of the great October Revolution of 1917.

What I have said so far has to do with the groundwork for any lessening of tensions and the minimum chance—in fact, the nonexistent probability—of such lessening of tensions on the basis of what the Soviet Union has declared and what it has said.

However, there is another class of arguments and reasons and sources to which we can repair if we want to examine the matter of deeds on their part. They have been mentioned here in the Senate Chamber during the course of the current debate.

Among those is the fact that with increasing degree and quantity the Soviet Union has been furnishing war material and supplies to the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong.

The Senator from South Dakota, who is present in the Chamber, made a splendid statement and a detailed documentation of that a few days ago. This includes virtually all of the sophisticated weapons going there in more recent days, including the military helicopters, which are perhaps as good as our best helicopters. It includes the surface-to-air missiles and a lot of other material, armament as well as ammunition, petroleum, and a host of other things.

Mr. President, recently this Senator urged the Senate to insist that consideration of the Consular Treaty with the Soviet Union be deferred until all of those measures affecting our relations with the Communist bloc nations have received careful consideration in an appropriate manner; that is, consideration of all of the parts of this major policy change as one complete package. This course is urged as a necessary alternative to the administration's present piecemeal, pig-in-a-poke approach.

That the Consular Treaty is one of the major bricks in the design of the East-West bridge builders cannot be denied. It is a bridge that, if it is built by this body, then



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we will be given another piece, the Open Space Treaty. If we approve this treaty, then in the administration's logic, we surely could not reject the East-West trade legislation.

If we accede to this course, we will have worked a major change in our foreign policy posture without ever having the opportunity to assess the effects of the parts in relation to the whole. Commonsense dictates that this is not a prudent course to follow in a matter of this importance.

What I am urging is not blind obstructionism. All that is asked is that if we are to consider a détente with the Communists, let us carefully examine all facets of the question in a proper perspective.

The first premise in this dialog, and the one on which all others must stand or fall, is the belief in some quarters that we are dealing with a "new" Communist. The administration has asked us to concede this point as though it were a truism.

Mr. President, the facts argue that this point can be legitimately contested.

It is a midwestern belief that if you are going to buy a horse, you must look at the animal. In seeking information regarding the transaction you "get it from the horse's mouth." In dealing with the Communists, we might profitably look to both their internal writings and their actions based on these words.

This consideration of the changing nature of communism is crucial in determining our relations with the whole Communist-controlled world. Is it correct that we should, as one Kremlinologist, former Ambassador George Kennan, asserted recently:

Think about Russia as simply another great power, with its own interests and concerns, often necessarily in conflict with our own, but not tragically so—a power different in many respects, but perhaps no longer in essential ones from what Russia would have been, had there been no Communist Revolution in that country 50 years ago.

Or is this opinion a product of wishful thinking, a widespread weakness of the free, open society, often adroitly exploited by the Communists themselves? Is it, in other words, a false assumption, which, ultimately, will lead to a disastrous failure of our foreign policy?

A glance through the leading United States and foreign newspapers over the last 50 years will establish first of all the fact that this "evolution of communism" theory is nothing new. Every important change within the Soviet ruling apparatus was, curiously enough, always accompanied by speculations in the West about significant changes in the Communist ideological outlook.

After the disaster of the civil war and of the so-called War Communism in 1921, Lenin announced the new economic policy—NEP—a temporary concession to private enterprise of small industry and farming, reported in the New York Times under a headline: "Lenin Has Thrown Communism Overboard." After Lenin's death the belief that communism had been abandoned had been further confirmed by events resulting from the struggle for power between Lenin's suc-

cessors, Stalin and Trotsky. The NEP was continued and even expanded, and Stalin called for moderation and collective leadership. He even rejected proposals for Trotsky's expulsion from the Party.

The free world reaction to these events was again mirrored in the press. The New York Times described the promised reforms as the "greatest step away from Marxism since the creation of the Bolshevik regime." Great importance was attached to promises as coming from Stalin, who is the Communist Party chief and successor to the power formerly held by Lenin. The London Daily Express called these steps the greatest—

On the road away from militant Communism. By 1927 Stalin adopted Trotsky's agrarian policy of collectivization, which resulted in the loss of 10 million lives by murder and famine and "liquidation of well-to-do peasants (kulaks) as a class.

After this irreversible trend toward liberalization was completed by forcing the peasant to accept the collective-farm system, new concessions were made in the field of civil rights. In 1936 a new Constitution was promulgated, described by Stalin as "the only thoroughly democratic Constitution in the world," which guaranteed all imaginable rights of Soviet citizens. There was so much talk abroad about the new departure from Bolshevism that even Stalin complained:

The fourth group of critics attacking the Draft of the new Constitution describes it as a "swing to the right," as "renunciation of the dictatorship of the proletariat," as "liquidation of the Bolshevik regime."

After scornfully mentioning some Polish and American newspapers which displayed a particular zeal in this respect, Stalin frankly stated:

I must admit that the Constitutional Draft really does leave in force the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and also leaves unchanged the present position of the Communist Party.

As for the international aspects of communism, Stalin, though himself an internationalist, has been credited with restoring national interest as a primary motivation of Soviet policy. The post-World War II spread of communism in Eastern Europe and Asia shows the doubtful value of this illusion of change.

The greatest wave as yet of speculations about change, softening of the Communists hit the free world after Stalin's death in 1953. A succession of Soviet leaders, Malenkov, Khrushchev, and now Brezhnev, representing the new collective leadership, have been blaming Stalin's cult of personality for the brutal excesses of that period and promising internal liberalization and peaceful co-existence with the outside world.

This did not prevent Khrushchev from unconstitutionally violating the collective farm statute in order to consolidate the existing 252,000 collective farms into 97,000 giant ones, thus strengthening the Communist Party control over the peasantry. This "liberal" reform affected millions of peasants by depriving them of or reducing their minute private plots, until that time their main source of subsistence. Neither did his incessant preaching of peaceful coexistence stop

him from crushing the Hungarian revolt, provoking the Cuban crisis, and openly supporting aggression—wars of national liberation—from Vietnam to Angola.

The religious persecution during the collective leadership became even more oppressive, according to all available information, than under Stalin, although it may now be carried out by administrative coercion and persuasion rather than by open burning of churches and killing of priests.

This sketchy survey of the changes and evolution of communism clearly demonstrates that during the 50 years of existence of the Communist system every period of tactical relaxation has been followed by a new period of repression.

If this were not sufficiently evident from the statements of the Communists themselves, it has been proven by experience. Ever since their first seizure of power, the use of intermittent soft policies and concessions has been as much a deliberate part of the Communists' internal policy as the use of terror and repression, and together with the inherent weakness of their system, has been evoking perennial prophecies of their gradual evolution or even early demise.

Just as they have always been voicing their intention of abandoning their aims of world revolution and renouncing the use of violence against the free nations, so have they also allegedly been terminating every form of domestic oppression, democratizing their dictatorial regime and even discarding the harsh and impractical economic theories of strict Marxist communism. However, each Soviet retreat was only introduced to insure the ultimate victory of socialism.

Let us go back to the Consular Treaty. Despite the official line of the administration that the main reason for concluding the Convention is our concern for the safety of U.S. citizens travelling in the U.S.S.R., some columnists grasped better the motives behind the maneuvers to induce the Senate to ratify the Convention.

Richard Wilson of the Cowles Publications, obviously impressed by certain witnesses before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ardent advocates of the changed communism theory, grasped the real meaning of the convention in his column of February 1967, entitled "Consular Pact Contains Symbolic Importance." Its ratification by the U.S. Senate will amount to sanctioning the administration's assumption of a basic change in the Soviet world outlook, their presumed abandonment of world revolutionary aims and the possibility of Western accommodation with the Communist-controlled States. In Mr. Wilson's words:

The U.S. relationship to this change is what is at issue in Senate ratification of the Consular Treaty. The issue divides those who wish to build bridges to the Soviet Union and those who do not. If the Senate gets across this particular bridge, it will undoubtedly build additional ones in the form of expansion of East-West trade relations, and ratification of the outer-space treaty.

A great many Senators are bothered that these bridges should be built while in other matters we continue to collide head-on with

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the Soviet Union, particularly over Vietnam. This all-or-nothing approach to our relations with the Soviet Union contains more emotion than logic. If both nations are willing to place Vietnam in a separate category and proceed with a step-by-step building of other relations in other respects, something is said about the confidence on both sides in an eventual settlement of their major differences.

I pointed out earlier that the Soviet Union not only has not agreed to place Vietnam in a separate category and proceed with the step-by-step building of other relations in other respects; they have rejected that proposition.

They said with respect to the package of related subjects to which the President referred at the Editorial Writers Conference in October, and in his state of the Union message:

We will have none of it until the United States permanently stops bombing in North Vietnam and until it ceases its acts of aggression in South Vietnam.

Since the Consular Treaty with the U.S.S.R. belongs to the realm of international relations and foreign trade, let us now investigate the Communist policies and their motivations in that crucial field of our mutual contacts.

Have they, as it is being claimed by detente apologists, abandoned their world revolutionary aims and are they ready to live in a pluralistic community of national states in peace as the free world understands it? Or are they still committed to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, with its totally different world outlook, based not on national but international class interest? Are the Communist-controlled states and especially the Soviet Union institutions primarily serving the limited, national interests of their inhabitants or are they revolutionary instruments, used by the respective Communist Parties in order to, in Lenin's words, "stir up, promote and support" the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary program all over the world?

I find it difficult to understand where the advocates of rapprochement find the confirmation of their claim that the Communists have abandoned their world revolutionary aspirations. Even the reading of the daily press, despite the often misleading interpretations of Communist operations, should convince us about the present far-flung revolutionary activities carried on by the U.S.S.R. and other Communist-controlled countries all over the globe. Moreover, we can find clear admissions of their commitment to support and accelerate the world revolutionary process, in innumerable official Communist statements, which are usually available in most of the world's languages.

One of the most recent documents worth reading is the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of January 4, 1967, printed in Pravda on January 8 under the title "On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution."

This very lengthy statement contains 8,500 words and surveys the 50 years of existence of the first Socialist State which was born on November 7, 1917. It is claimed that not only the Soviet peo-

ple but the toilers everywhere will celebrate this epoch-making event "the triumph of Marxism-Leninism, the ideals of the working class movement, the ideas of proletarian internationalism and friendship among nations."

Further on in the text, we find an explicit reaffirmation of doctrinal Marxism-Leninism as a world outlook:

The October Revolution showed a way of solving the vital problems brought to the fore by preceding world history: the future of society, the nature of social progress, war and peace, the destinies of world civilization.

The global validity of Marxism-Leninism has been vigorously reasserted: "The victory of the October Revolution confirmed the Leninist theory of socialist revolution. Marxist-Leninist teaching had been proved correct on the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and its replacement by socialism, on the vanguard role of the working class, led by the Communist Party, in the Revolution and in building a new society; on the dictatorship of the proletariat and its role in the struggle for the triumph of socialism; on the Soviets as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat and organs of genuine popular rule in a socialist democracy; on the alliance of the working class with the peasantry and other strata of the working people, under the leadership of the working class as the decisive force in the struggle for social liberation; on the industrialization of the country and the socialist transformation of agriculture; on the ways of solving the national question; on raising the living standard of the working people and carrying out a cultural revolution.

While the following text contains patently exaggerated boasts concerning Soviet achievements within the country during the last 50 years, the passages claiming that "the Great October Socialist Revolution is of enormous international significance," merit a careful reading.

Without accepting the Communist claim of beneficial consequences, it is true that "the revolution hastened the march of historical events," that "the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of the October Revolution have spread all over the world" and that "its gains became a mighty base for revolutionary transformation in all parts of the world."

The most important gains of the October Revolution was, of course, the conquest by the Communist Party of the old Russian State and its replacement by a proletarian or socialist state, the Soviet Union. This new type of state became not only a world revolutionary base but also the cradle of the contemporary world Communist movement which has now developed into a most influential political force in the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of the world along socialist principles.

An individual Communist, looking through the Marxist-Leninist class prism, sees the world not as composed of political formations, the states, but rather as composed of classes, whose interest and loyalty transcend and ignore national state boundaries. Again quoting the January 4, 1967 Communist Party Central Committee Resolution:

Socialism and capitalism, i.e., the forces of progress and those of imperialist aggression, are engaged in *irreconcilable struggle*. The imperialists will not stop at any crime in their attempt to hold back History and

arrest the mighty revolutionary movement towards liberation. American imperialism, having assumed the function of world policemen, is intensifying provocation in various areas of the world. U.S. imperialists have unleashed a gangster war against the Vietnamese people and are trying to strangle the freedom and independence of the peoples and establish their domination.

The forces of socialism—that is, the world socialist system, the Communist-controlled states, and the remaining Communist Parties—are bound by the principle of socialist or proletarian internationalism to mutual support. We can easily agree with the Central Committee's key assertion that—

The Soviet Union is in the forefront of the struggle against imperialism. Faithfully fulfilling its internationalist duty, the CPSU applies every effort to strengthen the cohesion and might of the socialist system, to rally closer the international Communist and working class movement on principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism; it supports the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against capitalist slavery; the struggle of peoples against colonial oppression and neo-colonialism; and consistently pursues a policy of strengthening the alliance with the forces of national liberation.

This certainly does not sound like a statement by a conventional government announcing a national anniversary celebration. It is also rather absurd to suggest, as we so often hear, that the Communist leadership is paying lip service to revolutionary terminology, which they continue to use by inertia or as a face-saving device, while they are irrevocably turning into pragmatic politicians devoid of revolutionary fervor, embourgeoisé, and ready to strike all kinds of deals with their Western counterparts.

The passages quoted above will be repeated throughout the anniversary year by every important personality of the Soviet Communist hierarchy, in one form or other, mostly quoting whole passages word for word, of the Central Committee statement. It is therefore superfluous further to buttress the argument that the directives quoted above represent the official party line in its strategic and tactical aspects.

One familiar with Communist doctrinal material will immediately realize as he studies the central committee's anniversary statement that he has before him a rehash of several sections of a programmatic statement issued in November 1960 by the 81-Party Conference held in Moscow.

The United States was also singled out in this statement as "chief imperialist country of today, chief bulwark of world reaction" and "its international gendarme, an enemy of the people of the whole world."

There are still those unduly impressed by the so-called Sino-Soviet rift, interpreted in most quarters erroneously as clash of national rivalries and not as an intramovement struggle for leadership aggravated by an apparent mental deterioration—as in Stalin's case—of Mao Tse-tung. They claim that at least the U.S.S.R. and the other Communist-controlled countries in Europe now prefer the nonviolent methods to achieve their aims. The constant Soviet advocacy of

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peace coexistence between states with different social systems, misunderstood as to its class struggle implications, also has helped in creating the general confusion.

A reading of some of the documents mentioned, all available in English, will easily reveal that whether transition to socialism will be violent or nonviolent depends on the conditions in each country.

Experience confirms that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily. In this case the degree of bitterness and the forms of class struggle will depend not so much on the proletariat as on the resistance put up by the reactionary circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people.

Since in the eyes of the Communists the will of the people in every capitalist country is represented by its vanguard, the local Communist Party, every resistance of the ruling classes—the capitalist or reactionary circles—to the demands of Communists will lead inevitably to revolutionary violence and ultimately to the most acute form of class struggle, the civil war. It is also well to remember that the old local civil war is largely a thing of the past. In the future every civil war unleashed by Communists and their sympathizers will become inevitably an international civil war, in which the foreign Communists are bound by the principle of proletarian internationalism to support the local ones.

With regard to the split, it has not prevented both the Soviet and Chinese Communists from attending and participating actively in the so-called Tricontinental Conference in Havana in January 1966, despite clashes between the two delegations.

More than 500 representatives of 79 Communist Parties and national liberation movements met to map out a coordinated strategy for the underdeveloped world. The meeting issued a series of declarations and resolutions pledging an intensification of revolutionary warfare, and established a military directorate to coordinate the various offensives.

Mr. President, it is difficult to conceive why this very important and significant tricontinental conference in Havana has received so little attention in the free world. It certainly was a highly significant conference. It made concrete recommendations. These recommendations are being carried out as rapidly and as effectively as possible; yet, we must resort to an analysis of that conference such as that which was given to the subject by J. Edgar Hoover in testifying in the other body not too long ago, and also the work done by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, of which I am a member.

The Soviet delegate, Sharaf R. Rashidov, fully supported the declaration of the Conference, which constitute a virtual declaration of war against non-Communist governments throughout the developing areas of the world.

As an official of the Organization of American States put it:

This Conference was a most blatant and open effort by the USSR, Communist China

and Cuba and their satellites to extend their power and influence in the free world, to exploit legitimate needs, to create discord and sow discontent and strife—in order to seek the violent overthrow of governments in this hemisphere and to supplant them with Communist dictatorial regimes, subservient to Soviet and Chinese Communist imperialism.

It was reported in the press—New York Times, February 17, 1966—that at least one South American Government launched a formal protest against the dual position of the Soviet Government: calling for armed revolution and yet seeking to gain influence with the governments that are to be overthrown. The Uruguayan Government summoned the Soviet ambassador in Montevideo to the Foreign Ministry to explain the statement made by the Soviet delegate, Rashidov who said in his lengthy speech that—

Throughout the course of its history, the Soviet Union, following the behest of the great Lenin, has been sacredly fulfilling its international duty, giving full-scale support to the peoples struggling against colonialism and imperialism for their national and social liberation. The peoples rising in the heroic struggle against imperialism, no matter what corner of the earth this may take place, may be certain that the Soviet people will always be on their side.

From our point of view it is interesting to note that he also expressed solidarity with the struggle of the people of Puerto Rico.

The Soviet ambassador's answer is available in summary in the two-volume Report on the Tricontinental Conference prepared by the OAS.

The Soviet disclaimer, couched in very arrogant language, denied the Soviet Government's participation in the Conference and based its denial on the fact that the Soviet delegation was composed of representatives of Soviet "social—or better, public—organizations and not of the Soviet Government." This is an old game played by the Communists, which unfortunately has often not been properly understood and countered by the non-Communists States.

We often speak, as did Secretary Rusk when testifying about the Consular Convention with the U.S.S.R., about "different systems of law, even of dissimilar systems of government." However, it may well be that it is our lack of understanding of the true nature of the Soviet state itself, or of any Communist-controlled state, for that matter, which makes it possible for the Soviet Government to use that kind of primitive, transparent disclaimer, as it did in the case of the Uruguayan protest, and many times before, as for instance, in countering our protests against the Comintern activities in the 1930's.

This lack of understanding of the nature of the Communist-controlled state is caused, first of all, by the fact that most political scientists in studying it are using a purely formalistic, positivistic approach, one based on study of external characteristics of that State, and are ignoring the philosophy which created it and is motivating its operations namely, Marxism-Leninism.

Even a superficial investigation of the Soviet Constitution of 1936 will discover some formal resemblance between the

Soviet state machinery and that of a Western-type democratic state. There is a bicameral parliament the Supreme Soviet, directly elected by the constituency. There is the Council of Ministers, the highest executive and administrative organ of the U.S.S.R. state power—article 64.

There is a separate Judiciary, with "independent judges, subject only to Law"—article 12. Chapter X contains what could superficially be defined as a bill of rights: "Basic rights and duties of citizens." There, however, the formal resemblance ends.

In order truly to grasp the nature of a Communist-controlled state, we must resort to its analysis from the point of view of a theory of state and law, ours as well as the Marxist-Leninist. We believe that, to use Burke's well-known definition:

A state is a necessary, natural institution, founded in the social nature of man.

Marx, Engels, and especially Lenin, proceeding from the class viewpoint, saw in every state an organization serving the ruling class. Logically, then, the socialist proletarian state is "only a weapon of the proletariat in the class struggle. A special cudgel, rien de plus." As the bourgeois state is believed by the Communists to be a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, the proletarian—socialist—state must exercise the dictatorship of its ruling class, that is, the proletariat or working class.

The doctrine of the dictatorship of the working class has since been the cornerstone of Marxist-Leninist state theory and practice. Soviet university textbooks on the theory of state and law, elaborating on this doctrine, explain that—

The dictatorship of the proletariat considered as mechanism appears as a complex system consisting of a sum total of "levers" and "transmission belts" and "the directive force," which is the [Communist] Party.

It is further explained that—

The Soviets with their executive machinery represent such levers and transmission belts; also, labor unions, cooperatives of all kinds, including collective farms, the Communist youth organization (*Komsomol*) numerous voluntary associations (for sport, defense, learning, etc.), which as a whole form the mechanism of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Thus, the state organs, the government in the broad sense of the word, are only transmission belts, or levers, used by the Communist Party to exercise its guidance, to direct, rule the so-called Socialist state. This has been reaffirmed as a constitutional principle in article 126, which states:

The most active and politically conscious in the ranks of the working class and other strata of toilers shall unite in the Communist Party, which is the vanguard of the toilers in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system, and the directive body of all organizations and societies of toilers, both public and governmental.

This gives the Communist Party an indisputable monopoly of power and control in every Communist-controlled state, together with the monopoly of nomination of candidates in an election.



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In the light of this analysis, one must reach the conclusion that the Soviet Communist leadership has a very low opinion of our intelligence and our understanding of the workings of their so-called state, if they seriously disclaim any Soviet Government participation in the Tricontinental Conference in Havana by asserting that the head of the Soviet delegation, Sharif R. Rashidov, candidate-member of the politburo of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which places him among the 19 most important apparatchiks in the U.S.S.R., represented only public-social-organizations and not the government.

The Communist Party itself is not an ordinary political party. It is a party of a new type, as the Communists themselves have correctly defined it. Its novelty consists in the unique features of its historical mission as a substitute for the state and state apparatus and in the originality of its internal structure. On one hand, it is a close hierarchical organization with a regular apparatus; on the other, it is an open mass party with a membership of many millions. Therefore, the party elite, the apparatchiks, virtually represent a party within a party.

The Communist Party is not simply the sole ruling state party; it is not even a state within a state. It is the state, but a new type of state, according to the Communist doctrine. Its novelty lies in the fact that the hierarchy of official state legislative organs is only the executive-administrative machinery for carrying out the decisions and instructions of a parallel hierarchy of formal executive party organs. A modern Communist state can exist without its official state apparatus, but it cannot exist without its party apparatus. Relationships between the party apparatus and the state apparatus are not those of coordination but of subordination; this in itself eliminates dualism in rule. Lenin destroyed Russia's old state organization in order to replace it with his new party machine. This machine was the system of partyocracy, as it has been very aptly defined in a recent monograph, "The Communist Party Apparatus."

A Communist Party is a party of a new type also because of its international class character. The new Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of 1961 describes it as—

An inseparable part of the International Communist and Working-Class Movement. The tried and tested Marxist-Leninist principles of the proletarian internationalism will continue to be inviolable principles that the Party will follow undeviatingly. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union will continue to strengthen the unity of the international Communist movement, to develop fraternal ties with all the Communist and Workers' Parties and to coordinate its actions with all the detachments of the World Communist Movement for the joint struggle against the danger of a new world war, for the interests of the working people for peace, democracy and socialism.

There is a school of thought which denies, at present, any possibility of restoring the former cohesion of the International Communist Movement. As

evidence they list the Sino-Soviet rift, the rifts between the U.S.S.R. and the European Communist-controlled states, frictions due to supposedly increasing nationalism in those states, and so forth.

I am afraid we may be ordering the funeral before the patient is dead. It is for this reason that this Senator again urges the Members of the Senate to insist that we be given the opportunity to consider the entire package, both treaties and trade legislation, intact rather than on a piecemeal basis.

Mr. President, by way of summary, I should like to suggest again that as much as anyone would want to see the end of the cold war, as much as anyone would want to lessen the thrust and the brutality of the cold war, and the hot war in which we are engaged in Vietnam, ratification of this treaty simply cannot be based upon the hypothesis or the proposition that there is a "new communism," or that there is a new partnership in the process of formation between the United States of America and the U.S.S.R.

There is simply nothing to indicate that the Iron Curtain is being formed into an open door. If anything, there is reason after reason to conclude, from overt acts as well as from well defined and definite statements, and declarations by Communist leaders, that they do not mean to let up for one moment in that position and posture which has made it necessary for this country to have entered into the cold war in the first place, and to have continued it since that time—about 20 years ago.

Certainly, there is nothing to indicate that they are going to abate one iota in their participation in the hot war in Vietnam. And, we are engaged in a hot war with the Soviet Union there because they are supplying the armaments, the munitions, the supplies, and the war materiel without which the war would come to an early and definite end if delivery of those articles of war were suspended or ceased by the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, it is for these reasons that I urge two things: One, that the Senate not, at this time, advise and consent to the Consular Treaty before it. Two, that the Senate should, as a matter of fact, insist upon a discussion of all the related subjects in this proposed major and radical change in our foreign policy before disposing of any of the component parts thereof.

It is only from that overall perspective that we will be able to render a decision which will be wise, and judicious.

It is my hope that we will be able to sustain the position of a complete, overall discussion when the matter before us comes up for final disposition.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HRUSKA. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, what the Senator says is very significant in the whole discussion that we are having about the desirability and undesirability of ratifying the consular treaty with Russia at this time of war. Admittedly she has become the arsenal of Hanoi and the sole source of military weaponry of

modern design which is being used to continue the war there and is making it more difficult to obtain peace. It certainly is escalating our American casualties.

It is certainly true also that deeds speak louder than words.

The Senator alluded to the fact that in the Record of Friday, March 10, I placed in the Record for public scrutiny for the first time a list of the supplies now available for shipment to Russia in unlimited numbers and without license.

I had this list printed in the Record because we have heard them described as nonstrategic and as peaceful goods. The facts are now before the public that the weapons are going from Russia to Hanoi.

I thought it would be illuminating to note just what kind of American shipments have been made eligible to the Russians by President Johnson's ill-advised and unprecedented Executive order of October 12, 1966.

That astonishing but revealing list will be found beginning on page S3543 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for March 10, and extending to page S3547.

I think it is illuminating reading for the country, and I think it should be must reading for every Senator before he votes on the treaty.

The Senator is aware that it was on October 12, 1966, that by Executive order President Johnson opened up these exports in trade to Russia and other Communist countries without license and without limitation.

The Senator pointed out that this act of appeasement and conciliation apparently did not serve very well the purposes of amity between the two countries, that this had no impact whatsoever on lessening the amount of war weapons which are being shipped by Russia to Hanoi, and that it has been only recently that these tremendously significant helicopters have been supplied by Russia to Hanoi.

The Senator would agree, I am sure, with the Senator from South Dakota that the helicopter activities of our American forces and our South Vietnamese allies have been one of the bright spots and one of the productive operations of our war effort.

Mr. HRUSKA. Those activities have been among the most efficient and effective forces in the waging of that war. They put us far ahead of the enemy. Yet, that "advantage" is being rapidly dissipated by the appearance on the scene of the Russian-supplied helicopters.

Mr. MUNDT. Precisely, and it was for that reason that the North Vietnamese Communists sent out that great Macedonian call to their comrades in Moscow, "We must have helicopters."

They got helicopters, and they got helicopters of the best possible design. They got a substantial number of these helicopters and, of course, they got them from Russia.

Mr. HRUSKA. And, very likely, with training by Russian helicopter pilots.

Mr. MUNDT. There is no question about that. That would follow the for-

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mula pursuant to which some 200 Migs have been supplied by the Russians to the Communists of North Vietnam in order to attack and destroy our American Air Force. Those planes were also escorted and accompanied by well-trained Russian Mig pilots who trained the North Vietnamese on how to use them with the maximum of effectiveness.

Talking about deeds, I point out further that by his Executive order on October 12, 1966, openly and directly defied the expressed desire of Congress—incorporated in rollcall votes in both the Senate and the House over the past few years—that these wartime exports to Russia be ended or curtailed, President Johnson opened the Pandora's box for war-profiteering Americans to send anything listed on these pages of the Record of March 10, 1967, to which I have just referred and which I have identified starting on page S3543.

After President Johnson had done that, just exactly one fortnight later, on October 26, 1966, there was an Associated Press story out of Moscow, corroborated by an Associated Press story out of Warsaw, in which those countries announced that the Communists were sending an additional \$1 billion worth of military aid to Hanoi. Scarcely a device, I might add for ushering in a detente between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

It seemed to follow as the night follows the day that, since the Russians had an additional source of material coming from the United States to shore up some of their consumer shortages and some of their consumer needs and some of their industrial deficiencies, they felt free to make available an extra \$1 billion of aid to help defeat us in Vietnam and to destroy or decimate our American forces there.

Certainly here is a deed not in the direction of amity, not in the direction of a detente, and not in the direction of trying to work out some conciliatory arrangements with the United States. There instead is a deed designed for the destruction of our war effort in Vietnam.

It seems to me that kind of a deed speaks much more effectively than the words we hear on occasion emanating from Moscow.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, when the Senator from South Dakota referred to this list of more than 400 nonstrategic items freed from export control between this country and the Soviet Union, I am reminded of the list of other things which have been done in the way of benefits and concessions and movements to try to mollify and appease the Soviet Union with never a return or reciprocal item advanced by the Soviet Union.

In addition to the 400 nonstrategic items, for example, the President lists these other things in the state of the Union message:

We have agreed to open direct air flights with the Soviet Union.

We are determined that the Export-Import Bank can allow commercial credits to Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, as well as to Rumania and Yugoslavia.

We have entered into a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union for another two years.

We have started discussions with interna-

tional agencies on ways of increasing contacts with Eastern European countries.

Then he continues:

I ask and urge the Congress to help our foreign and trade policies by passing an East-West trade bill.

There are other items, also.

The point I wish to make is that concession after concession and act of appeasement after act of appeasement have been extended in favor of the Soviet Union and the other Communist countries of Eastern Europe, with never a return item, except to bite the hand of those who seek to make a little progress toward ameliorating or concluding the cold war.

Of course, the matter of 400 so-called nonstrategic items is a leader among those lists. In time of a hot war, such as that in which we are engaged, I should like to know what item contained in that list of 400 is nonstrategic.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HRUSKA. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. In this day of modern warfare, it is almost impossible, it seems to me, to single out any conceivable item we might export to Russia, in order to help her overcome a deficiency, which could not be definitely and accurately termed a war item. Even if it were something strictly for consumer utilization, when a country needs to import an item of that kind, it does so because a desperate shortage of it exists at home.

Once Russia gets this consumer item from a country such as the United States, you automatically relieve a certain number of the labor force, you relieve the pressures on certain amounts of raw material, you relieve the utilization of certain amounts of the mechanical and industrial complex of Russia. You free all those elements to start producing additional war supplies. And the Russians need the additional war supplies because they are shipping so many of them, first, not only to Hanoi, where we are at war with their armaments and at war with their guns, but also to other trouble spots of the world where they are tending to arm other nations and groups so as to make mischief for the United States.

Mr. HRUSKA. Another item was the extending of credits for American exports to help in the construction of the Soviet-Italian Fiat automobile factory to be constructed in Russia.

This is an extension of credits, Mr. President, at a time when the citizens of the great Midwest, engaged in farming and ranching, find it difficult to obtain credit; and when they do obtain it, they pay a high price for it. In face of our dwindling gold supply and in face of the indirect but very effective assistance to the North Vietnamese which results therefrom, the administration is going forward to help the economic and the industrial productivity and to strengthen the position of the Soviet Union and the other Communist countries. Such action simply does not make sense.

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is correct. The \$50 million credit which we are extending to the Communists for the purpose of helping them build that automotive plant is a credit which is underwrit-

ten by every American citizen. We all have the ugly expectancy of having to pay more taxes or, in lieu of that, to go deeper into a national debt which has already lit the fires of inflation so that the budget of every householder has suffered. In any event, if the Communists do not repay the \$50 million, the money will have to be paid by the taxpayers or by the credit of the United States. And for what? To build an automobile factory. And why do they want that?

Every schoolchild knows that when this country is at war—and the wars get big and tough and consume a great deal of our armaments and much of our time and labor—the industry we turn to first is the automotive industry of the United States, in order to shift from making automobiles to making tanks, to making guns, to making planes.

In this regard, we are actually lending \$50 million to the Russians to enable them to manufacture, by 1969, when the plant is scheduled to be completed, additional armaments to kill additional boys in a war which very likely will still be continuing in 1969, if we continue the insane policy of shipping to the fellow who is providing the weapons to continue the war the things he needs to keep his country viable enough so that he can continue the shipments.

Mr. HRUSKA. I am grateful to the Senator from South Dakota for the contribution he has made to this discussion.

In addition to furnishing warstuffs to Vietnam, however, the Soviet Union has been taking other actions which clearly show that the ratification of this treaty will not have any effect at all on the shortening of the cold war or even a slight letup in the war.

There is the matter of the Soviet Union continuing to subsidize in a substantial way the only Communist nation in the Western Hemisphere—Castro's Cuba. The Soviet Union has been subsidizing Cuba consistently for a number of years, without any signs of a letup. Perhaps it is a fine, friendly action to a fellow Communist nation, but it does not indicate any desire on the part of the Soviet Union to get to a point where it will lessen the cold war in which we are engaged.

Another overt act on the part of the Soviet Union is its recent enlargement of the military budget for the coming year. The military budget of the Soviet Union has been constantly stepped up in the last 2 or 3 years because of the drain on their war reserves to furnish munitions and armament to the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong.

A further factor is the installation of the antiballistic missile system in various parts of the Soviet Union, posing for our country the necessity of meeting that situation by a comparable step if we do not wish the Soviet Union to be in a military posture superior to ours.

Mr. President, this is not the time to enter into a consular treaty of this kind. The Soviet Union should do something to indicate that such a step by the United States will be entertained as good faith for ending the cold war, or even a slight letup in it. We should consider the entirety of the package and not consider in

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attempted isolation, the ratification of the consular treaty.

Instead of having some concrete, overt action by the Soviet Union along the lines I indicate, we have had an outright rejection of the treaty as a part of the big package, and, in fact, an apparent rejection of the entire package. We also have a stepping up of the hot war which Russia is waging against the United States in Vietnam.

The argument in favor of ratifying the consular treaty is, "We want to end the cold war, and therefore we ought to ratify this treaty." This plea is not applicable. There is no indication that a letup by the Soviets will take place in the cold war because of the ratification of the treaty, if the treaty should, unhappily, be ratified.

The principal basis of the proponents' arguments—those who favor ratification of the treaty—seems to be along this line, and it is to this line that I should like to devote the greater part of my remarks:

First, it is said that we are dealing with a new communism.

Second, it is said, as appears in the state of the Union message by our President:

We are shaping a new future of enlarged partnership in nuclear affairs and in economic and technical cooperation in trade negotiations, in political consultation and in working together with the governments and the peoples of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

There is a little intervening language and, then, continuing—

Our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are also in transition.

We have language such as that referred to and language such as that used a week ago today in the city of Fulton, Mo., at Westminster College by the Vice President, who said:

It is my belief that we stand today upon the threshold of a new era in our relations with the peoples of Europe—a period of New Engagement.

And I believe that this new period, if we do not lose our wits or our nerve, or our patience, can see the replacement of the Iron Curtain by the Open Door.

Here we have these statements and a new commitment, a new further partnership with the governments and peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; and the statement "Replacement of the Iron Curtain by the open door."

They are all statements to the effect that there has occurred a change in the attitude, activities, and relationships between this country and the Soviet Union. Yet, nowhere have we had any assignment of reasons, any proof, nor any indication that any of these things have occurred. Hopefully they will occur. No one will engage in more earnest or fervent hope that they do occur in due time than I and I know that that hope is shared by everybody, but we have to be realists.

There is not only a lack of proof, but also there is much evidence to the contrary.

Whatever changes they might show, their adamant and vigorous attitude points toward increasing an escalation of the cold and hot wars in which the

Soviet Union is engaged against us, rather than the reverse.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HRUSKA. I yield.

Mr. COTTON. The Senator from New Hampshire is very deeply impressed with all that the distinguished Senator from Nebraska has been saying. I think it is a masterful, thorough, and analytical presentation of things the Senate should be thinking about before we vote on this momentous question. I wish to ask the Senator from Nebraska in regard to the statement just made, if he agrees, that so far as we have been able to discern, there has not been one single overture or any act of softening, indicating that there is a new attitude toward us on the part of the Soviets. Am I correct in that statement?

Mr. HRUSKA. The Senator is correct, as far as the study, the reading, and the observations of this Senator are concerned. I have searched in vain for some act that could be construed in the light in which the Senator referred, and I have been unable to find it.

Mr. COTTON. Knowing the thoroughness with which the Senator from Nebraska undertakes all of his research before engaging in as important an utterance on the floor of the Senate as he has made, I am satisfied, that there has not been any significant change.

I wish to ask the following question: If there had been any change in the attitude of the Soviet Union, or if there had been made to our Government directly or indirectly secretly or otherwise, any promise or offer, or any suggestion that there might be a change, and that that change of attitude might be effected if we ratified this treaty, does not the Senator from Nebraska think that every Senator, who has the solemn duty to vote on this ratification should be informed of that fact, and not have it merely hinted at?

Mr. HRUSKA. I agree with the Senator. If there are any secret communications or unpublicized communications every member of the Senate should be informed of them.

There have been rumors from time to time that they do exist but for high reasons of state they cannot be disclosed. I have never been able to track them down. I know that one of our colleagues—I shall not undertake to identify him; he can speak for himself if he wishes—came across rumors that two different kinds of some classified reason that has been advanced by those in the executive department; each was different from the other and did not include reference to the other.

If there are such things they should be disclosed, and they could be disclosed in a discreet manner. We could consider them as classified, and for reasons of national security not disclose them. That would be one thing, but to deny that information, if any does exist, I think we should assume that there are no such reasons, and vote accordingly.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HRUSKA. I am happy to yield to the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. COTTON. I am sure the Senator from Nebraska is just as reluctant as the Senator from New Hampshire, and others in the Senate who have misgivings about this treaty, to stand in the way of any real step that might make our relations with the Communist world better in the future, and avert even in some small degree the possibility of nuclear war. I am sure he is just as reluctant as any of us are in that respect. Is that correct?

Mr. HRUSKA. Yes. I have declared that to be so in my statement and I repeat it now.

Mr. COTTON. If I interpret correctly what the Senator has just said, if he were informed in the strictest confidence by the responsible heads of the Government of the United States of any real facts that would indicate that ratification of this treaty would hasten peace in the future, I know that he, as is true of many of the rest of us, would take that fully into consideration without divulging the facts, if they should not be divulged.

Mr. HRUSKA. There is no question about that, as far as my thinking and belief are concerned.

Mr. COTTON. It is my understanding, as far as the Senator from Nebraska is concerned, and as is the case with the Senator from New Hampshire, that at no time has any responsible person given us any information, any real evidence that this treaty that we are urging upon the Soviet Union, that we are in a sense supplicating them to accept, will have any more significance than our action in paying tribute to the pirates of Tripoli—before we rebelled and decided that we would not continue to pay tribute—while hoping that they would be kinder to us?

Mr. HRUSKA. No such information has come to me from any source in the executive departments. Other Senators will have to make their own disclosures as to what may or may not have happened to them in this regard.

Getting back to the oft-repeated assertions that we are dealing with a new communism or are entering into a new partnership with the government and people of the Soviet Union, and the statement that the replacement of the Iron Curtain by the open door is imminent, and that all we have to have is patience and the other things that go with it, such as forbearance, I do not know how much more by way of appeasement, perhaps, or modification we must display. On that subject, I wish to address myself to the proposition that there has been no change in the stance or in the program of the Communist Party.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nebraska yield for a question?

Mr. HRUSKA. I am happy to yield.

Mr. MURPHY. As the Senator said, there has been no change. Am I correct in believing that in spite of the fact that, from time to time, we read in some of the press that there has been a thawing of the cold war, the Senator means that actually, as to basic principles or a change of objectives, there has been no noticeable change in, let us say, the last 15 years?

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Mr. HRUSKA. In that respect, I should like to expand my statement and correct any impression I may have created. There have been no changes for the better in the stance or in the program of the Soviet Union, so far as America is concerned. There have been some changes which have been to the harm, the detriment, and the expense of the United States, both in the program of the Soviet Union and in its activities.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it not true that because of the so-called or alleged changes, it now seems, or has seemed in the last year or so, that the activities of the Soviet Union and around the world have been expanded? Is there not evidence that the Soviets were concerned in the Congo, in Cuba, and in many other areas, whereas 5 years ago they were not spread out in those areas?

Mr. HRUSKA. There is no question about that. That subject was thoroughly canvassed in the tri-continental conference of the Communist nations in Havana, Cuba, in January 1966.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it not true, as I have put it in oversimplification, that for the past 30 years we have been the "main door" prize and still remain so, except that the conditions of our health are not so good now as they were 5, 10, 15, or 25 years ago?

Mr. HRUSKA. The Senator puts it well, indeed. I certainly accept that characterization.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nebraska yield?

Mr. HRUSKA. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. HANSEN. The Senator from Wyoming is most impressed with the able and learned presentation being made by the Senator from Nebraska.

All the mail which has come to my office since I became a Member of the Senate, taken together, excluding the consular treaty, has not approximated the interest evoked by the debate on the consular treaty.

As the Senator from Wyoming understands it, the primary concern of the State Department in trying to secure the ratification of the consular treaty seems to be for the 18,000 Americans who visit Soviet Russia annually—at least, that is the number who visited Russia a year ago.

By way of contrast, it might be observed that in 1966, 900 Russians visited this country. The number of Russians who come here seems not to fluctuate, but the number of Americans going to Russia has increased steadily. I think that we would be naive, indeed, to assume that ratification of this treaty would do anything but encourage further visitations to Soviet Russia, by American businessmen and tourists.

To say that we cannot draw the line of demarcation between what are non-strategic materials and strategic materials belies the fact. I do not know how much of the Russian labor force last year was involved in the production of agricultural commodities, but I do know that not many years ago 47 percent of the Russian labor force was involved in trying to produce enough food for the Russian people. So the remarks of the Senator from Nebraska, in saying that whatever we export to Russia helps to

contribute to their warmaking capability, are precisely true.

If we send food or anything else over to Russia, it will make them better able to help destroy this country, as they are presently trying to do in Vietnam.

I wrote to the Secretary of State a few days ago, expressing great misgiving because this country proposes to authorize a \$50-million loan to an Italian automobile manufacturer to set up shop in Soviet Russia.

As has been pointed out by the able Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. CORTON), it is true that it is one and the same thing, so far as war-making capability is concerned, when we talk about the manufacture of cars and the manufacture of war armaments. How better could we assure the advancement of Russian capability to make helicopters, airplanes, tanks, and missiles than to contribute sophisticated machine tools and related technology to their automaking capabilities?

Thus, this subject concerned me and was the basis on which I wrote to the Secretary of Defense, denouncing the action and expressing my great concern over what it could do to our posture and our position in Vietnam.

I know that all of us share the common hope that we can soon resolve the conflict in Vietnam. I think the best way to resolve it is to achieve a position of strength, to demonstrate our superiority on the battlefield, and to weaken the enemy. If he is weakened and sees that he cannot hope to prevail, then I suggest that he will be more inclined to sue for peace and want to sit down at the conference table and, resolve the conflict there.

I repeat: the way to guarantee this result, in my mind, is to negotiate from a position of strength. It is in that context that we must review the consular treaty.

It seems to me that anything we do which enables the Soviets better to supply the forces of the Vietcong, better to assist the North Vietnamese people, will make more difficult the early resolution of the conflict in southeast Asia.

Therefore, I am convinced that the ratification of the Consular Treaty now will encourage more of our businessmen to go to Soviet Russia. They will know that they will have the protection of our consulates. They will know that if they do happen to get into trouble, the strong hand of Uncle Sam will be near by to help bail them out of that trouble.

Mr. President, I appreciate, as we all do, the importance of better understanding among the nations of the world. I think that were it not for the fact that we are today involved in this conflict, there is every argument and every reason, and there should be every desire on our part, to enter into this sort of arrangement; but this is not the time. The priorities are set by the situation in southeast Asia.

Because of that, I compliment the Senator from Nebraska for calling to our attention, as he has, the impact and the importance of this treaty.

I believe that the President of the United States has mentioned in his state of the Union message the different bridges we hope to build between our

country and those behind the Iron Curtain.

But, this is not the time to take steps to try to bring about a better detente with the Soviet Union, to try to bring about a better understanding with the other Iron Curtain countries, or to introduce an agreement which will weaken, not strengthen, America's position in southeast Asia. Because of that I hope the Senate of the United States will consider well the very important observations the Senator is making at this time.

Mr. HRUSKA. The Senator is very generous in his comments, and I appreciate them very much. The contributions he is making in regard to the subject at hand are very constructive.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HRUSKA. I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. MURPHY. I was called from the Senate Chamber, and have had an opportunity to speak with a group of mayors of towns and cities in California. They asked me what the current business in the Senate was. I recommended that they go to the galleries and hear the discussion which the able Senator from Nebraska is propounding.

I asked them what they thought would be the wishes and reactions of the people in their cities. They unanimously said that there was no question that the people of their cities would be against the ratification of this treaty.

I have noticed something else on which I should like the Senator to comment. Usually, as we get into discussions of this kind, we are overwhelmed with a flood of polls in newspapers and periodicals. I have seen no polls as to the wishes of the people with respect to the subject before the Senate at this time. I wonder if there is any particular significance to that fact. I wonder if the Senator has noted the lack of such polls.

Mr. HRUSKA. We will continue to look for polls, to see what information may result.

Mr. MURPHY. Does the Senator from Nebraska agree with the Senator from California that possibly the polls—and I am just old fashioned enough to believe this is a representative form of government and that I am here to represent the best wishes of the people of my State—might well show that a great proportion of the people in the States would be against this treaty, and that therefore some of its proponents had decided it would be better not to publish those polls? Does the Senator think that is a possibility?

Mr. HRUSKA. There may be the possibility that that is the reason the polls are not being published.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HRUSKA. I yield to the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. COTTON. Has the Senator noticed, as this Senator has, sometimes with a little amusement, although we do not like to think lightly of such grave matters—I have noticed this for a number of years—that whenever there is a strong sentiment on the part of people for proposals and programs that are espoused by those in power, the sentiments of the people as expressed in polls



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are thrown in our faces day after day as the spontaneous outbursts of the individual beliefs of the great American people. But now, when there is a flood—and if the Senator has had the same experience this Senator has had, perfectly overwhelming flood—of personal letters from the folks back home, protesting the ratification of this treaty, and begging us to resist it, we are told that these letters were all inspired. Now we are told that these letters were all the result of propaganda by organizations; that they do not represent the individual thoughts and deep feelings of individuals; and that we should disregard them?

Has the Senator noticed that strange contrast of opinion as between when the people's feelings are really their own feelings—as in this case—and when their feelings are not their own, but what someone else says they are.

Mr. HRUSKA. The Senator puts the matter in good perspective.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HRUSKA. I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. I think the comments on polls introduced by the Senator from California and commented upon by several of my colleagues are quite pertinent. I might raise the question, Where is George Gallup? Where is Louis Harris? This subject has been debated and discussed for well over a month, perhaps 2 months. It is one of the most vital issues before the country. It is one of significant departure from all previous American history. The decision, one way or the other, will have an impact on the war in Vietnam. What more vital subject than this for the poll of the people's thinking, Dr. Gallup or Mr. Harris? Is this a time for silence?

I wonder if it is not pertinent to the fact that over the weekend the Senator from South Dakota had conversations with at least two important editors. I think it may have been three, but I will be conservative and say it was two. They very vividly told me they had been importuned by the State Department to write strong editorials in support of the treaty, and the editorials were forthcoming.

I wonder what kind of pressures and propaganda are behind the desire to downgrade and ignore the wishes of the people, and not even to reflect them in polls such as those operated by Dr. Gallup and Mr. Harris on a host of other issues and then to go further and decry those who have opposed the treaty as simple automations, being inspired by someone else. One of our colleagues has even called them crackpots or extremists.

I believe this is still a representative government, with the concept that on matters such as this we must get information and views of the people, who can expect some kind of response when the people make their wishes known by correspondence, telephone calls, and telegrams.

After all, who are the people writing us? How can a Senator assume the arrogant position that the only time the people are right is once every 6 years when they vote him in?

rest of the time the people are wrong; that we should ignore their opinions except on that on precious day, election day, when we get elected?

It is these same people who pay taxes. It is the people who elect the Representatives and Senators that they send to Congress. These same people are supplying over 500,000 boys in uniform today, and they may have to do double that composite figure if the war goes on too much longer. I do not think it is right to downgrade them.

I invite any Senator who will sit down and read his mail on this issue—not take the secondhand reports of his secretary or some staff member for it, but sit down and read the letter himself—to then express his conviction on the floor that these letters are from crackpots and extremists. One Senator expressed the opinion that such letters were from “nuts.” Mr. President, these letters are not from “nuts.” These are not in the main letters from inspired sources. It is easy to spot inspired letters. We can easily recognize the same monotonous phrases. The letters we are getting are written by individuals who express their individual, serious views, as can be noted by the handwriting and viewpoints expressed. Many come from serious students of American history. I think the people have some right to have from Senators some expression as to their overwhelming judgment and desires, and that they are not to be kicked aside arrogantly by Members who say those letters are coming from crackpots and extremists and should be ignored. We should not hear, “Oh, I get letters 100 to 1 in favor of opposing the treaty, but I am going to vote for the viewpoint of that one because I know his sentiments are sincere and genuine, and the rest are opinions reflecting some inspired viewpoint of other sources or from some extremist group.”

I resent that view because to me it brushes aside the views of the people, which, in our representative form of government, we should reflect and carefully consider. I resent the idea that we should swagger around and say that the people do not know what they are talking about on the simple question of do we or do we not want to ratify a consular treaty with Russia in this time of bitter war? There are no top secrets involved. If the question involved were one about the wisdom of building or not building an antiballistic missile system, then we might be able to say that we must rely on the expert opinions of technicians and scientists and specialists in nuclear warfare, and say that, wise or unwise, our decisions were going to have to be determined by the opinions of those experts.

On this issue, however, Mr. President, the people are the experts, because they are the ones who will lose or profit. There is nothing complicated here; nothing confusing; nothing technical. It is merely a question of whether or not, in this time of war, we wish to do something which inevitably must lead in the direction of encouraging those gunmakers in Moscow to ship more supplies to North Vietnam. On this issue, we have no technical or secret information.

I was interested in the very eloquent and persuasive remarks by the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HANSEN], who has made some excellent points in his discourse. The question that the Senator from Nebraska is presently discussing—about what element of change, if any, has crept into this whole matter called communism, and if there has been change, has it been change which we should welcome and embrace and encourage, or is it a change which indicates a greater degree of belligerency and greater degree of antipathy by the Communists against the best interests of the United States—is most pertinent.

In the matter of East-West wartime trade, I think we have a case in point. I recall that Lenin said, back in 1921:

All it is necessary to do is to bribe capitalism with extra profit, so as to get the machines with which to defeat it economically.

That was Lenin's Communist doctrine then, and of course it was he who wrote the bible of communism. He was the master and the architect of the Communist creed.

It seems to me the students of communism overseas have today become the masters. Now they have taken that Lenin recipe seriously. They have carried it to the logical degree that all it is necessary to do now in time of war is to bribe capitalism with extra profits to get it to supply the tools to kill its own sons fighting for freedom in Hanoi. That is a pretty serious extension of this Lenin doctrine but it fits it like the hand fits the glove.

If it can be argued, as it probably will, that those who come from pastoral rural States do not have any great industrial machines, do not have any international banking houses, and thus perhaps are not qualified to talk about the intricacies of international trade and the rich profits it is supposed to provide for certain people in this country, perhaps they will permit me to quote from a magazine which is seldom read out in the grassroots areas of our country. Let me present the testimony of a magazine published in one of the great financial centers of our land—Barron's Business and Financial Weekly.

On January 16, 1967, its front-page story was headed, “Dangerous Bridges,” with the subheading “Proposals for Expanded East-West Trade Rest on Shaky Ground.” I recommend that article to the reading of all of my fellow Senators. It is true that we do not have much chance to read this magazine out in the country areas of South Dakota; but I am happy to note that here one of the great metropolitan financial journals of this country looks with a skeptical eye on this “national desire” to develop expanded trade, to increase profits for some and to provide earlier death for others—all under the persuasive heading of “Building Bridges.”

After arguing eloquently, through several pages, against the unwisdom of running the risk of prolonging a war which we in the Senate ought to be spending our time trying to shorten, instead of expanding; in its concluding

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There remains the final supreme consideration for any American businessman who may still hanker after elusive profit from selling to the Communists: He must decide, in his own private conscience, whether the profit is worth the personal risk that some day, sooner or later, on some near or distant battlefield, his neighbor's son or his own may be struck down by a weapon which his zeal for trade put into the enemy's hands.

Only those with very short memories can forget, Mr. President, that we learned this lesson—or should have learned it—back in 1940 and 1941, when proponents of the same line of thinking which urges us now to move in the direction of expanded trade with Russia were practicing the fine art of selling scrap iron to the Japanese, to help them build their war machine, while some of us, the present speaker included, were moving around the country whenever opportunity presented itself, and declaring our opposition in the Senate of the United States and the House of Representatives. I served in the House of Representatives at that time.

What happened? On Pearl Harbor Day, we found that our Pacific Navy was virtually destroyed, and more than 3,000 American casualties had occurred, in an infamous surprise attack by the people to whom we were selling, for a profit, war supplies less significant by far than the war supplies we are selling to Russia today.

At least it could be said by those advocating such policy then, "We are not at war with Japan yet. They have not killed any American boys yet. You pessimists who believe there might be a war with Japan could be wrong. In the meantime, we are making extra plush, war-fed profits in America."

This administration cannot even use that defense today, Mr. President, because 3 years after the heavy casualties began coming in, 3 years after the big war had begun in Vietnam, the present Commander in Chief, Mr. Johnson, by a scratch of his pen, on October 12, 1966, opened up the shipment of iron ore and scrap metal again, plus 399 other commodities, to the country then and now busy at the job of supplying the guns to kill American boys.

It is no wonder, it seems to me, that Americans write in, in such vast numbers—Americans who, we hope, will continue to support this war effort until we are successfully out of it, but Americans who form part of the great body politic which is becoming growingly discontented with this whole curious war, which goes on and on, is now in its fifth year, and now we hear the same people who say, "We would like to do something to shorten it," support this pagan formula to increase the traffic in blood, which is certain to prolong it.

I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nebraska yield, so that I may ask the Senator from South Dakota a question?

Mr. HRUSKA. I am happy to yield.

Mr. THURMOND. I should like to associate myself with a remark just made by the Senator from South Dakota on the point that the people who are writing in, opposed to this treaty, are not "extrem-

ists" or "crackpots," or whatever term some of those who espouse this treaty so ardently would apply to them. I can say that my mail—and I know my people—reflects a sentiment very strongly against this treaty, and it is coming from some of the ablest, finest people in South Carolina. I believe that is typical of the kind of people who are writing about this treaty throughout the Nation. I believe it is typical of the members of the Republican Party.

Last Saturday evening, I had the pleasure of speaking to the Young Republicans of four States—Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Maryland—and the District of Columbia. When I spoke to them for a few minutes on this consular treaty, together with other subjects upon which I spoke, I know that the terrific response I received shows that the Young Republicans representing this area of our country are strongly opposed to ratifying this treaty.

Mr. MUNDT. And why not? They have to go to war along with other young Americans, to be shot at by the products which we help to fabricate by sending additional industrial supplies to the arsenal of Hanoi.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from South Dakota is exactly right.

I believe that the more people study this treaty, the more they will become convinced that it is not in the best interests of this country.

I have not heard one sound argument yet in favor of the treaty. I have given nine specific arguments against it. I have not heard one sound argument yet to cause me to support the treaty.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, one of the distressing developments to the Senator from South Dakota is that he does not believe in the growing centralization of power in the Nation's Capital. After it has been concentrated in the hands of a few dozen people, those people are presumed to personify the authority of the people, and they are empowered to exercise authority over all of us.

One of my reasons for opposing this so-called new liberalism is because it moves in the direction of placing fewer and fewer and fewer top-level officials in control of the lives of the remainder of us in the country.

My quarrel is with the new liberals who believe in this concentration of power.

The traditional liberals abominated both economic monopoly and political monopoly in the same breath. However, our new liberals embrace political monopoly. They abhor economic monopoly, as we all do, but they embrace political monopoly which is infinitely worse.

The new liberal would tip the pyramid of American government upside down, with the people at the bottom and the power structure of government at the top.

In this connection, some of the comments which I have recently heard made on the floor have disturbed me greatly. The comments have downgraded and attacked and ridiculed the statements contained in the mail received from con-

scientious people who write in opposition to this treaty.

This reflects the growing sentiment among some public officials in this country. It frightens me more greatly almost than the consequences of the ratification of this treaty. That involves the tendency for some people in high positions—some of them elected, but most of them appointed—to develop an arrogant contempt for the people who base their whole philosophy for the solution of an economic or social problem on the concept: "You can't trust the people. You can rely only upon the politicians, only upon the Government, only upon the bureaucrats, only upon the snoopers, only upon the administrators, and only upon the politicians." I deny that liberal concept emphatically.

I think politicians are wonderful people. I am proud to call myself a politician, but we do not have halos around our heads. We do not know the answers to all of the problems.

We come from among the people who write letters and who vote to keep us here. However, when we develop the attitude, as an elected or appointed public official, that people cannot be trusted, that people are always wrong, that people have not any ethics, good judgment or sound sense, and cannot run a good business or a good school, that kind of "liberalism," concentrated in the hands of a few people with the right to shove everybody else around, is totally and demonstrably wrong.

It is nevertheless contained in the answers some people get back home to the letters they are writing on the Consular Treaty. I know, because, for one reason or another, my name has been listed as one of those leading the opposition to the treaty. I get copies of a lot of letters received by my colleagues in the Senate; and also copies of the Senators' replies when they disappoint or provide disenchantment to the recipients.

I know some of the things that have been written by Senators to their constituents. The names of the Senators who wrote them could not be dragged out of my mouth with a 20-mule team.

But, I can say this: If any Senator from South Dakota ever wrote his constituents in that manner and manifested his contempt for the judgment and knowledge of individual citizens, those citizens would find some way to get rid of him before he served out his term, and I think properly so.

I read the letters and I know what is being written.

I am a little ashamed of the whole approach that would try to condemn as an ignoramus, a crackpot, or a nut the mother of a son in Vietnam who takes her pen in hand and says: "I don't think it is wise at this time of war to support and ratify this Consular Treaty."

I think the Senator from South Carolina is treating with one of the problems of our times, the whole question of whether we the elite, we the officials, or we the officeholders have this right to assume such lack of good faith or good judgment on the part of the people who write us in such great numbers in opposition to this treaty.

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I think the concept is wrong, and that the voice of the people in America still has a right to be heard, and should on occasion be reflected in our public policy.

Mr. THURMOND. Is it not a fact that this war would not be going on now if it were not for Russia providing North Vietnam with weapons with which to fight the war?

Mr. MUNDT. I think that can be factually demonstrated. I have heard many military people allude to the fact that the war in Vietnam would have been over at least 12 months ago if the Russians had not supplied the sophisticated weapons with which to fight the war, and over 95 percent of the petroleum required by the Vietnamese Communists to continue it.

I have yet to find a military man who will tell me how a country can fight a modern war without gasoline, oil, and petroleum.

Those products go to Hanoi almost exclusively from Russia.

If we want to find out how to end the war, we must figure out a way to get the Russians to quit supplying the materials. We cannot do that by kissing them on the cheeks and saying: "Go out and kill more men."

Mr. THURMOND. I visited Vietnam in December. I made a report after my visit in Vietnam where I spent a week, another week in that area of the world, Thailand, Burma, Japan, and other countries.

I read one brief paragraph from my report:

## RUSSIA'S ROLE IN VIETNAM WAR

The Soviet Union is furnishing North Vietnam anti-aircraft weapons, surface to air missiles, jet fighter planes, heavy artillery, artillery rockets, machine guns, rifles, ammunition, advanced radar system, ships, helicopters, trucks, heavy construction equipment, bridge building materials, oil mines, and other supplies with which to fight the war. Without the aid the Soviets are providing, North Vietnam and the Viet Cong would be unable to wage the war very long. Soviet Russia has it within her power to stop the war and bring the combatants to the negotiating table without delay.

Mr. MUNDT. We can also add to that list the MM ground-to-ground rocket which has proven so effective in killing not only our American troops, but also our allies there.

That weapon is now being employed by our enemies in the South Vietnamese part of the conflict.

Mr. THURMOND. I am convinced that if we ratify this treaty with Soviet Russia now, it will do at least two things, aside from other harmful effects.

It will raise the prestige of the Soviet Union throughout the world by misleading nations into believing that now the great United States, the most powerful nation in the world, has tremendous respect for the Soviet Union and is willing to enter into agreements with the Soviet Union signifying that the United States is willing and able to trust the Soviets.

Mr. MUNDT. There is no question about that.

Mr. THURMOND. I am convinced that if we ratify the treaty, the treaty will cause other nations to wonder where the United States stands. The countries behind the Iron Curtain

tions, will give up hope. They will feel that the last solid country, a country which could help to save them some day, has gone over to the Soviet side.

They will wonder whether we have gotten together with the Soviets and are just going to forget them and leave them where they are and do nothing to help them in any way, shape, form, or fashion, to emerge from behind the Iron Curtain.

It seems to me that if we ratify the treaty, it will have a severe and serious psychological effect all across the free world.

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator brings up an interesting point.

Let us consider the case of an American businessman who is traveling in Russia in the Baltic area, visiting some of the cities of the Baltic States.

Let us assume that he gets into trouble in Latvia. He decides to make use of this consular arrangement. It seems to me that by that very act we will be giving, ipso facto, recognition to the fact that Latvia and Estonia and Lithuania, those three great little brave Baltic Republics, have now ceased to exist. And they will officially be recognized by us as forever part of the Soviet Union, because we will have been forced into the position of working through our consular officers with the Russian Government in that connection.

The contrary side of the coin could also be true. Let us say they set up this consular office in Chicago, and a Latvian in this country gets into trouble in the United States and we put him in jail. Under the Consular Treaty, the Russian consular officer would have a right to talk to this Latvian citizen in jail, because we would have the consular treaty with Russia, and Russia claims control over Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. By recognition of that fact, also, it seems to me, ipso facto, we have recognized a status of affairs which officially and directly our Government has refused to recognize.

Many of the involvements in this matter, when we think them through, as to what will happen at the end of the road, give this innocent-sounding treaty much more significance than the fact that perhaps it can be beneficial on the average to nine Americans per year traveling for pleasure or profit in Russia.

Mr. THURMOND. Does it not amount to de facto recognition by forcible inclusion of these nations—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—into the Soviet empire?

Mr. MUNDT. The State Department denies that automatically it is de facto recognition, and I acquiesce in and accept their position. But the operation of the treaty will be such that, sooner or later, over there or in this country, we will have an American in trouble in Latvia or Lithuania, or a Lithuanian or an Estonian in trouble in this country, and the Russians, under the terms of the treaty—and they have a right to do so—will immediately insist upon being notified and insist upon talking to him, as through consular officer. So, whether he wishes to see the Russian consular officer or not, the fact is that we must let the Russian representative talk to him. This is a de facto recognition at that point that those Baltic countries cease to have

just as well turn out the light of hope that they will ever again attain that status, so far as the United States is concerned.

The Senate, which piously expresses its sympathetic attitude toward the captive nations by agreeing to a Captive Nations Week resolution every year, sympathizing with them, can, by this Consular Treaty action, condemn them to the status quo so far as we are concerned, because it will provide that de facto recognition and it will destroy their rightful and proper and enduring hope that, come some happy day, their homelands can once again be independent.

Once you put them under the domination of the consular operations, as this treaty does—on both sides of the water—as set up in the mechanics of treaty, you have provided a beautiful device for the Russians to express themselves, through actions, that they are in charge of the Baltic and other captive countries, and if we wish to have communication between the nationals of those countries and this country, Mother Russia and its consular officers are the ones to provide it.

If this is not de facto recognition, I should like someone from the State Department to say what it is.

Mr. THURMOND. We may pass resolutions in the Senate each year extending our sympathy to the people of the captive nations behind the Iron Curtain, but are we not, in effect, nullifying and counteracting such action when we take real action, which counts, by ratifying the treaty?

Mr. MUNDT. At least, the representatives and the spokesmen in this country of the captive nations are unanimously in that belief. It seems to me that all the rules of logic, all the rules of precedence, and all the rules of international procedure indicate that these representatives of the captive nations are demonstrably correct; that what we are doing is creating a pathway, and when we walk down this Consular Treaty pathway and it begins to function, this is the end of their hope of this country doing anything but recognizing the status quo and the fact that they are, indeed, permanently the captives and the satellites of the Soviet Union.

Mr. THURMOND. I ask the Senator from South Dakota this question: If the Soviet law is so capricious that the U.S. consular employees need special immunity while in the U.S.S.R., is the time yet ripe to normalize travel and trade relations with the Soviets?

Mr. MUNDT. This kind of treacherous line of argument is encountered in connection with what is known as Executive Reservation No. 2, on which the Senate will vote on Thursday of this week, which is being opposed by some of the spokesmen for the treaty who say:

No, this won't help cut down the shipments of arms to Hanoi, and this won't make it more likely that we can work out an agreement and negotiation by using this diplomatic tool to induce them to stop. All you have to do is to simply go along with them and say nothing, just go ahead and acquiesce and all will be well.

As the Senator from Nebraska has pointed out, and as the Senator from New



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afternoon, in this instance they have us on our knees, crawling to Moscow as supplicants, if we ratify the treaty. The Russians have not ratified it. They have not even presented it to their ratifying body. They want us to come crawling to them and say, "Please, would not you now ratify the treaty which we have ratified?" That is a miserable position in which to put Uncle Sam, if we are attempting to negotiate or to curtail the shipment of supplies from Moscow to Hanoi.

It certainly follows that it is a capricious line of reasoning, which says, on the one hand, "you can depend upon the word of the Russians to move in the direction we want them to move"; but, on the other hand, "they have so many curious laws that they maliciously are arresting our citizens and we have to have a special consular treaty with them to protect our American travelers in Russia."

I believe that the welcome news from Moscow over the weekend that they have agreed to release an American citizen, proves the argument that has been made on the floor of the Senate and before the Committee on Foreign Relations for weeks; that if you have a little more rugged and determined exercise of diplomacy with Russia on this side of the ocean, you can utilize without this treaty, through the diplomatic understandings existing between all civilized nations, every kind of contact you need to induce them to release prisoners or to induce us to release prisoners. You do not need this unprecedented treaty, with all the problems attendant upon it, even in peacetime—but, in time of war, this treaty can become a signal to the world that others had not better tie too closely to Uncle Sam because we are also reaching out with a special arrangement of our own with their Communist enemy in Moscow.

Mr. THURMOND. Some people will take the position that the Soviet Union is evolving into a peaceful country. Yet, the treaty that is before the Senate for ratification has been violated 20 or more times since it was signed. Does that sound like the Soviet Union is evolving? If so, what does evolving mean? When are they going to live peacefully in the world and respect the dignity of a citizen and of all free people?

Mr. MUNDT. When the Senator from South Carolina and I began discussing this matter and utilizing the time generously granted us by the Senator from Nebraska, the Senator from Nebraska was in the process of discussing whether there was an evolution in the Communist approach in Moscow. Perhaps I should bow out now and permit the Senator from Nebraska to answer that question and then to resume with the point he was developing when he was interrupted by the numerous colloquies.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the distinguished Senator from South Dakota, and I thank the able Senator from Nebraska for his kindness in yielding.

Mr. HRUSKA. I thank the Senator from South Dakota and the Senator from South Carolina. They have engaged in splendid colloquy. It has been

constructive, enlightening, and very pertinent to the subject at hand.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, let me say once more how very appreciative I am to the Senator from Nebraska for the able presentation he has made this afternoon. The Senator from Nebraska has placed the consideration of the Consular Treaty in its proper context. Certainly, this Nation has demonstrated for all the world to see that America desires no extension of its control, or authority, or jurisdiction over the people of any area anywhere in the world.

The United States hopes, rather, for an extension of peace, and for an extension of the right of peoples everywhere to self-determination through law and order.

I share the hope of most Americans in anticipating the time when we can, one nation with another, achieve a better understanding and a greater accord than now exists.

We cannot overlook the fact that this country has made great efforts since the end of World War II to bring about the sort of condition which will, we hope, some day, characterize the world.

We have contributed more than \$125 billion toward foreign aid and rebuilding war-torn countries. We have done everything we possibly could do to lessen war tensions, to bring about better understanding, to bring about a better detente with the nations of the world, and particularly with those behind the Iron Curtain. But it seems to me that there is an analogy which ought to be considered as we discuss the Consular Treaty. It is that the Congress of the United States we are discussing the wisdom of providing in a bill the control of small arms. We recognize, or at least there are those who believe, that we want to bring about a diminution of lawlessness, murder, and all acts attendant to crime in this country, and one of the ways to do that is to limit the supply or transshipment of arms. Yet we turn right around in this Consular Treaty and seem to think that there is no relationship between the Consular Treaty and the encouragement of businessmen to move into Russia, to have new trade with Russia, to supply Russia with goods, and that Russia will not have greater opportunity to devote more effort to the manufacture of war-making materiel. We seem to find no relationship between that fact and our efforts to supply Russia with 400-some-odd so-called non-strategic materials in the context of enlarging her general economic and hence, her war-making capability.

I suggest we ought to take into account such consideration because, in my mind, there is a very real relevance between our supplying Russia with anything today and Russia's being able to supply Vietnam with war-making materiel.

Once again I want to record my appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Nebraska for having called to the attention of the Senate some very important considerations that we ought to mull over seriously before we give our advice and consent to the implementation of this Consular Treaty.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter dated February 28, 1967, from the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, addressed to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT].

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
February 28, 1967.

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,  
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: As members of the Steering Committee of Members of Congress For Peace Through Law, we declare our support for the proposed Consular Convention with the Soviet Union.

Having studied the terms of the treaty, it is our conviction that this convention provides practical benefits and protection for the thousands of U. S. citizens who visit the Soviet Union annually, as well as those U. S. officials and employees who serve in that country.

We recognize the Consular Treaty as a priority step toward the expressed purposes of this group: "To coordinate congressional concern into specific action for the development of international cooperation." Accordingly, we are urging our membership to join us in the effort to gain widespread support for its ratification.

(Signed) Joseph S. Clark, Chairman; Congressman Jonathan B. Bingham; Senator John Sherman Cooper; Congressman Donald M. Fraser; Senator Jacob K. Javits; Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier; Senator Robert F. Kennedy; Senator Eugene J. McCarthy; Congressman Patsy T. Mink; Congressman F. Bradford Morse; Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal; Congressman Richard S. Schweiker.

#### ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order of March 9, 1967, that the Senate, in executive session, stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 47 minutes p.m.) the Senate, in executive session, adjourned until Tuesday, March 14, 1967, at 11 o'clock a.m.

#### NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate March 13, 1967:

##### U.S. MARSHAL

Walter N. Lawson, of South Carolina, to be U. S. marshal for the district of South Carolina for the term of 4 years to fill a new position created by Public Law 89-242, approved October 7, 1965.

##### IN THE ARMY

The following-named officer to be placed on the retired list in grade indicated under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3962:

##### To be general

Gen. Paul Lamar Freeman, Jr., O17704, Army of the United States (major general, U.S. Army).

The following-named officer under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sec-